In Europe

conquering that “Eurosclerosis”. At Schengen in 1985 we decided to do away with internal border controls between the Benelux countries, France and Germany. Later on, more and more countries joined. In that way, a single policy could be formed with regard to border controls, security and asylum issues. In 1989 the internal market was ready to go and then finally in 1991 you had the Treaty of Maastricht which made way for, among other things, the arrival of the euro in 1999 and 2001.
    ‘In the 1980s, though, we had to deal not only with a European policy line, but also with a NATO line and everything that brought with it. The EEC and NATO were two distinct cooperative structures, separate worlds, each going their own way. Helmut Kohl and I, for example, were veryopposed to the stationing of cruise missiles, while Mitterrand was much more accommodating on that score. Not because he was pro-American, but because he felt that a clear reply to the Soviets was needed.
    ‘Naturally, we were very interested in what was happening in the Soviet Bloc, and we talked about it among ourselves, along the lines of, “What do you think of this Gorbachev fellow?”, but we didn't see it as a common issue. Until the wall came down. Then, suddenly, we had to deal with it. Kohl foresaw the consequences right away: this was the historical opportunity for which Germany had been waiting so long. He put everything he had into effecting the merger of the DDR and the Federal Republic in 1990, and he succeeded. But for us, well, how does one deal with that? Were we to grant unconditional support to a reunified Germany? And what would happen after that? Wouldn't that new Germany go on to lay claims to what had once been East Prussia? Historians are wrong when they say that, around 1989, no one was worried any more about the sanctity of the Oder-Neisse border with Poland. Because there were powerful political forces at play within Germany, people who would have loved to see the old situation restored. Major potential conflicts still lay between Germany and the rest of Europe.
    ‘So Mitterrand and Kohl made a deal: you, with your strong Deutschmark, will support the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the new European currency – and, along with it, the French franc. In return, we will support German unification – on condition that you leave no room for doubt concerning the definitive status of the Oder-Neisse border. I was worried about Poland as well, but Kohl gave me his word that maintaining the Oder-Neisse border would be the
sine qua non
of the debate. He was convinced of that, but I still had my doubts. Had a decision to correct the border in an easterly direction been put to the vote in Germany – and all kinds of groups were trying to get things to that point – we would have had a major problem on our hands. And Kohl was enough of a politician to know that the slightest thing could have moved it all beyond his control. Those millions of old
Heimatvertriebene
, such powerful forces, there were such strong emotions involved …
    ‘Later, Kohl wrote to Gorbachev and said: I've made the German parliament abide by the Oder-Neisse border, and now I'd like you to do something for me … I don't think that was merely bluffing on his part. Hereally saw it as his own personal achievement that, by acting calmly and wisely, he had reconciled the Germans to the immutability of the OderNeisse border. But if that was truly an achievement, logic says there must also have been a chance that things could turn out differently. Kohl was always reassuring the people around him, including me, telling us there was no need to worry. But to say it wasn't an issue, oh no. Of course it was an issue.
    ‘Ruud Lubbers and Helmut Kohl, two old European friends who split up over German reunification, that's the way publicists wrote about it later. But that's not what it was about. We were on very good terms, true enough, we often carried on long conversations. And until Maastricht, one year after German reunification, everything was still fine. Right before the Maastricht summit, in fact, Kohl and I had lunch together. We had a good talk, both of us were in favour of the creation of the EMU, that was our common line of approach. Kohl accepted the fact that I would chair the meeting, not only on technical matters, but also in terms of its content. At that point I was probably the only one who could keep the British from exercising their veto. The treaty was