The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

form also survives afterwards. For in some
cases there is nothing to prevent this; e.g. the soul may be of
this sort-not all soul but the reason; for presumably it is
impossible that all soul should survive.) Evidently then there is
no necessity, on this ground at least, for the existence of the
Ideas. For man is begotten by man, a given man by an individual
father; and similarly in the arts; for the medical art is the
formal cause of health.
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4
    The causes and the principles of different things are in a sense
different, but in a sense, if one speaks universally and
analogically, they are the same for all. For one might raise the
question whether the principles and elements are different or the
same for substances and for relative terms, and similarly in the
case of each of the categories. But it would be paradoxical if they
were the same for all. For then from the same elements will proceed
relative terms and substances. What then will this common element
be? For (1) (a) there is nothing common to and distinct from
substance and the other categories, viz. those which are
predicated; but an element is prior to the things of which it is an
element. But again (b) substance is not an element in relative
terms, nor is any of these an element in substance. Further, (2)
how can all things have the same elements? For none of the elements
can be the same as that which is composed of elements, e.g. b or a
cannot be the same as ba. (None, therefore, of the intelligibles,
e.g. being or unity, is an element; for these are predicable of
each of the compounds as well.) None of the elements, then, will be
either a substance or a relative term; but it must be one or other.
All things, then, have not the same elements.
    Or, as we are wont to put it, in a sense they have and in a
sense they have not; e.g. perhaps the elements of perceptible
bodies are, as form, the hot, and in another sense the cold, which
is the privation; and, as matter, that which directly and of itself
potentially has these attributes; and substances comprise both
these and the things composed of these, of which these are the
principles, or any unity which is produced out of the hot and the
cold, e.g. flesh or bone; for the product must be different from
the elements. These things then have the same elements and
principles (though specifically different things have specifically
different elements); but all things have not the same elements in
this sense, but only analogically; i.e. one might say that there
are three principles-the form, the privation, and the matter. But
each of these is different for each class; e.g. in colour they are
white, black, and surface, and in day and night they are light,
darkness, and air.
    Since not only the elements present in a thing are causes, but
also something external, i.e. the moving cause, clearly while
‘principle’ and ‘element’ are different both are causes, and
‘principle’ is divided into these two kinds; and that which acts as
producing movement or rest is a principle and a substance.
Therefore analogically there are three elements, and four causes
and principles; but the elements are different in different things,
and the proximate moving cause is different for different things.
Health, disease, body; the moving cause is the medical art. Form,
disorder of a particular kind, bricks; the moving cause is the
building art. And since the moving cause in the case of natural
things is-for man, for instance, man, and in the products of
thought the form or its contrary, there will be in a sense three
causes, while in a sense there are four. For the medical art is in
some sense health, and the building art is the form of the house,
and man begets man; further, besides these there is that which as
first of all things moves all things.
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5
    Some things can exist apart and some cannot, and it is the
former that are substances. And therefore all things have the same
causes, because, without substances, modifications and movements do
not exist. Further, these causes will probably be soul and body, or
reason and desire and body.
    And in yet another way, analogically identical things are
principles, i.e. actuality and potency; but these also are not only
different for different things but also apply in different ways to
them. For in some cases the same thing exists at one time actually
and at another potentially, e.g. wine or flesh