The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are
not the same; for ‘one’ means a measure, but ‘simple’ means that
the thing itself has a certain nature.) But the beautiful, also,
and that which is in itself desirable are in the same column; and
the first in any class is always best, or analogous to the
best.
    That a final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is
shown by the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is
(a) some being for whose good an action is done, and (b) something
at which the action aims; and of these the latter exists among
unchangeable entities though the former does not. The final cause,
then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by
being moved. Now if something is moved it is capable of being
otherwise than as it is. Therefore if its actuality is the primary
form of spatial motion, then in so far as it is subject to change,
in this respect it is capable of being otherwise,-in place, even if
not in substance. But since there is something which moves while
itself unmoved, existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise
than as it is. For motion in space is the first of the kinds of
change, and motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion;
and this the first mover produces. The first mover, then, exists of
necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of
being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle. For the
necessary has all these senses-that which is necessary perforce
because it is contrary to the natural impulse, that without which
the good is impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise but can
exist only in a single way.
    On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of
nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy
for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot
be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are
waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and
memories are so on account of these.) And thinking in itself deals
with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in
the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And
thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object
of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into
contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object
of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the
object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. But it is active
when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than
the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to
contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and
best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we
sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this
compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also
belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is
that actuality; and God’s self-dependent actuality is life most
good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being,
eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and
eternal belong to God; for this is God.
    Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that
supreme beauty and goodness are not present in the beginning,
because the beginnings both of plants and of animals are causes,
but beauty and completeness are in the effects of these, are wrong
in their opinion. For the seed comes from other individuals which
are prior and complete, and the first thing is not seed but the
complete being; e.g. we must say that before the seed there is a
man,-not the man produced from the seed, but another from whom the
seed comes.
    It is clear then from what has been said that there is a
substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible
things. It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any
magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces
movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite
power; and, while every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it
cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot
have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at
all). But it has also been shown that it is impassive and
unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior to change of
place.
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8
    It is clear, then, why these things are as they are. But