The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

then, from what has been said that time contains
something indivisible, and this is what we call a present.
    We will now show that nothing can be in motion in a present. For
if this is possible, there can be both quicker and slower motion in
the present. Suppose then that in the present N the quicker has
traversed the distance AB. That being so, the slower will in the
same present traverse a distance less than AB, say AG. But since
the slower will have occupied the whole present in traversing AG,
the quicker will occupy less than this in traversing it. Thus we
shall have a division of the present, whereas we found it to be
indivisible. It is impossible, therefore, for anything to be in
motion in a present.
    Nor can anything be at rest in a present: for, as we were
saying, only can be at rest which is naturally designed to be in
motion but is not in motion when, where, or as it would naturally
be so: since, therefore, nothing is naturally designed to be in
motion in a present, it is clear that nothing can be at rest in a
present either.
    Moreover, inasmuch as it is the same present that belongs to
both the times, and it is possible for a thing to be in motion
throughout one time and to be at rest throughout the other, and
that which is in motion or at rest for the whole of a time will be
in motion or at rest as the case may be in any part of it in which
it is naturally designed to be in motion or at rest: this being so,
the assumption that there can be motion or rest in a present will
carry with it the implication that the same thing can at the same
time be at rest and in motion: for both the times have the same
extremity, viz. the present.
    Again, when we say that a thing is at rest, we imply that its
condition in whole and in part is at the time of speaking uniform
with what it was previously: but the present contains no
‘previously’: consequently, there can be no rest in it.
    It follows then that the motion of that which is in motion and
the rest of that which is at rest must occupy time.
<
    div id="section50" class="section" title="4">
4
    Further, everything that changes must be divisible. For since
every change is from something to something, and when a thing is at
the goal of its change it is no longer changing, and when both it
itself and all its parts are at the starting-point of its change it
is not changing (for that which is in whole and in part in an
unvarying condition is not in a state of change); it follows,
therefore, that part of that which is changing must be at the
starting-point and part at the goal: for as a whole it cannot be in
both or in neither. (Here by ‘goal of change’ I mean that which
comes first in the process of change: e.g. in a process of change
from white the goal in question will be grey, not black: for it is
not necessary that that that which is changing should be at either
of the extremes.) It is evident, therefore, that everything that
changes must be divisible.
    Now motion is divisible in two senses. In the first place it is
divisible in virtue of the time that it occupies. In the second
place it is divisible according to the motions of the several parts
of that which is in motion: e.g. if the whole AG is in motion,
there will be a motion of AB and a motion of BG. That being so, let
DE be the motion of the part AB and EZ the motion of the part BG.
Then the whole DZ must be the motion of AG: for DZ must constitute
the motion of AG inasmuch as DE and EZ severally constitute the
motions of each of its parts. But the motion of a thing can never
be constituted by the motion of something else: consequently the
whole motion is the motion of the whole magnitude.
    Again, since every motion is a motion of something, and the
whole motion DZ is not the motion of either of the parts (for each
of the parts DE, EZ is the motion of one of the parts AB, BG) or of
anything else (for, the whole motion being the motion of a whole,
the parts of the motion are the motions of the parts of that whole:
and the parts of DZ are the motions of AB, BG and of nothing else:
for, as we saw, a motion that is one cannot be the motion of more
things than one): since this is so, the whole motion will be the
motion of the magnitude ABG.
    Again, if there is a motion of the whole other than DZ, say the
the of each of the arts may be subtracted from it: and these
motions will be equal to DE, EZ respectively: for the motion of
that which is one must be one. So if the whole motion OI may be
divided into the