The German Genius

he thought that there were Urphänomene , primordial forms in nature that gave rise to other, later forms. Granite, for example, was for him the archetypal rock, “the basis of all geological formation.” He thought that basalt (now known to be volcanic rock) was a “transitional” form of granite, in the same way that the whale was (for him) a transitional animal between fish and mammal and the polyp a transition between animal and plant forms. 36
    It was Goethe’s view that crystallized granite was “the first individualisation of nature,” the first step away from the Urstoff , and that “second-level” transitions produced the simpler organic forms, such as corals and ferns. As Karl Fink has put it, this is “becoming” as applied to nature.
    Goethe became almost obsessed by the intermaxillary bone because he thought it might reveal the transition from one species of skull to another. He had familiarized himself with the theories of Carl Linnaeus (1707–78) suggesting that facial bones were the distinguishing characteristic of zoological types, and it was Goethe’s argument that the intermaxillary bone appears between the two main bones of the upper jaw, containing the four incisor teeth. He identified the bone to his own satisfaction in such domestic and wild animals as the walrus, lion, oxen, and the apes, but, most important of all, he considered it the “distinguishing mark” between apes and humans, “playing no part in the facial structure of the former but important in the latter.” This was another of those ideas that was more radical then than it appears now—on this system of understanding, animals were seen as on the same continuum as man, a pre-Darwinian notion that conflicted with biblical dogma. 37 Goethe believed it was self-evident that fish, amphibians, birds, and mammals were all derived from one “primeval form” (“ nach einem Urbilde ”). There had, he said, been a series of “successive changes” that had produced the variety we see about us, and he thought there were two crucial differences between organic matter and inorganic matter, namely the “indifference” of the latter and the “purpose” and organization of the former, plus the fact that organic matter has “borders” and consists of individuals, botanical or zoological. Here too, Goethe is groping to understand his world in a pre-Darwinian, nonbiblical fashion.
    Goethe’s researches on optics and color theory were also predicated on another set of borders, the juncture where darkness and lightness meet. 38 This produced in him the notion that there are three forms of color—one originating in the physiology of the eye, a second originating outside the eye (observed through optical mediums), and a third located in the substance observed. More than this, though, all forms of color—physiological, physical, and chemical—are for Goethe derived from a primal phenomenon, the polarity of light and darkness. For him, this polarity was equivalent to the attraction and repulsion in magnetism, plus and minus charges in electricity, even major and minor keys in music. It was analogy run wild, a perfect example of Romantic science and out of date even when it was published. 39
    Finally, there was Goethe’s understanding of the scientific method, the experimental approach. He accepted the fundamental point that “nature has no system,” that she “emerges from an unknown centre” and evolves “to an unrecognisable border.” Abstractions conceived by the mind can therefore be misleading: “We can’t force nature in this way; all we can do is try to ‘overhear’ her secrets.” 40
    Goethe recognized that language may not—ever—exactly match nature and so, in the process, may “freeze” understanding in unnatural ways. “Through words we neither express completely the objects nor ourselves.” Poetic language was for him the deepest link between language and nature, whereas the experiment was a demonstration of nature, “both more and less vivid than language.” 41 “The mark of the modern scientist,” he added, “is possession of sufficient reflective skills to distinguish between himself, his language and the object of his investigation…He must avoid turning perceptions into concepts and concepts into words and then operating with these words as if they were objects.” 42 The debt to Kant is clear and very modern.
    In some ways this was Goethe’s greatest achievement: the search for the