Decision Points

he would do a thorough, careful job. In early February, Colin spent four days and four nights at the CIA personally reviewing the intelligence to ensure he was comfortable with every word in his speech. On February 5, he took the microphone at the Security Council.
    “The facts on Iraq’s behavior,” he said, “demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort—no effort—to disarm as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.”
    Colin’s presentation was exhaustive, eloquent, and persuasive. Coming against the backdrop of Saddam’s defiance of the weapons inspectors, it had a profound impact on the public debate. Later, many of the assertions in Colin’s speech would prove inaccurate. But at the time, his words reflected the considered judgment of intelligence agencies at home and around the world.
    “We are both moral men,” Jacques Chirac told me after Colin’s speech. “But in this case, we see morality differently.” I replied politely, but I thought to myself:
If a dictator who tortures and gasses his people is not immoral, then who is?
    Three days later, Chirac stepped in front of the cameras and said, “Nothing today justifies war.” He, Gerhard Schroeder , and Vladimir Putin issued a joint statement of opposition. All three of them sat on the Security Council. The odds of a second resolution looked bleak.
    Tony urged that we forge ahead. “The stakes are now much higher,” he wrote to me on February 19. “It is apparent to me from the EU summit that France wants to make this a crucial test: Is Europe America’s partner or competitor?” He reminded me we had support from a strong European coalition, including Spain, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and all of Eastern Europe. In a recent NATO vote, fifteen members of the alliance had supported military action in Iraq, with only Belgium and Luxembourg standing with Germany and France. Portuguese Prime Minister José Barroso spoke for many European leaders when he asked, incredulously, “We are faced with the choice of America or Iraq, and we’re going to pick Iraq?”
    Tony and I agreed on a strategy: We would introduce the secondresolution at the UN, joined by the visionary leader of Spain, Prime Minister José Maria Aznar . If we lined up enough yes votes, we might be able to persuade France and Russia to abstain rather than veto. If not, we would pull down the resolution, and it would be clear they had blocked the final diplomatic effort.
    The second resolution, which we introduced on February 24, 2003, was important for another reason. Tony was facing intense internal pressure on the issue of Iraq, and it was important for him to show that he had exhausted every possible alternative to military force. Factions of the Labour Party had revolted against him. By early March, it wasn’t clear if his government could survive.
    I called Tony and expressed my concern. I told him I’d rather have him drop out of the coalition and keep his government than try to stay in and lose it.
    “I said I’m with you,” Tony answered.
    I pressed my point again.
    “I understand that, and that’s good of you to say,” he replied. “I absolutely believe in this. I will take it up to the very last.”
    I heard an echo of Winston Churchill in my friend’s voice. It was a moment of courage that will stay with me forever.

    At Tony’s request, I made one last effort to persuade Mexico and Chile, two wavering Security Council members, to support the second resolution. My first call was to my friend President Vicente Fox . The conversation got off to an inauspicious start. When I told Vicente I was calling about the UN resolution, he asked which one I meant. “If I can give you some advice,” I said, “you should not be seen teaming up with the French.” He said he would think about it and get back to me. An hour passed. Then Condi heard from the embassy. Vicente had checked into the hospital for back surgery. I never did hear from him on the issue.
    My conversation with President Ricardo Lagos of Chile did not go much better. He was a distinguished, scholarly man and an effective leader. We had negotiated a free trade agreement that I hoped Congress would approve soon. But public opinion in Chile ran against apotential war, and Ricardo was reluctant to support the