Decision Points

Korea; and pledged assistance to all countries resisting communist takeover, the Truman Doctrine.
    As in Truman’s era, we were in the early years of a long struggle. We had created a variety of tools to deal with the threats. I made it a high priority of my second term to turn those tools into institutions and laws that would be available to my successors.
    In some areas, we were off to a good start. The Department of Homeland Security , while prone to the inefficiencies of any large bureaucracy, was an improvement over twenty-two uncoordinated agencies. The FBI had created a new National Security Branch focused on preventing terrorist attacks. The Defense Department had established a new Northern Command with the sole responsibility to defend the homeland. The Treasury Department had adopted an aggressive new approach to disrupting terrorist financing. We had recruited more than ninety countries to a new Proliferation Security Initiative aimed at stopping international trafficking of materials related to weapons of mass destruction. Based in part on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, we had created a new National Counterterrorism Center and appointed a director of national intelligence—the largest reform of the intelligence community since Truman created the CIA.
    In other areas, we had work to do. Some of our most important tools in the war on terror, including the TSP and the CIA interrogation program, were based on the broad authority of Article II and the congressional war resolution. The best way to ensure they remained available after I left office was to work with Congress to codify those programs into law. As Justice Robert Jackson explained in a landmark opinion in 1952, a president has the most authority when he is acting with the explicit support of Congress.
    The challenge was how to present the TSP and the CIA interrogation program to Congress without exposing details to the enemy. I believed it was possible, but we would have to work closely with members of Congress to structure the debate in a way that did not reveal critical secrets. We were developing a strategy to do that. Then two events forced our hand.

    “The
New York Times
is on the surveillance story again,” Steve Hadley told me in December 2005. The previous year, the
Times
had considered running a story exposing the TSP. Condi and Mike Hayden had talked the paper out of revealing the key elements of the program.
    I asked the
Times
publisher, Arthur Sulzberger, Jr. , and editor, Bill Keller , to come see me on December 5, 2005. It was a rare request, and I appreciated their willingness to speak face to face. They arrived around 5:00 p.m. Steve Hadley, Andy Card, Mike Hayden, and I greeted them in the Oval Office. We sat by the fireplace beneath the portrait of George Washington. I told them the nation was still in danger, and their newspaper was on the verge of increasing that danger by revealing the TSP in a way that could tip off our enemies. Then I authorized General Hayden to walk them through the program.
    Mike is a calming personality. He is not a macho guy who tries to intimidate people with the stars on his shoulders. He talked about his long career in intelligence and his natural suspicion about any program that could result in collecting information on U.S. citizens. He outlined the safeguards in place, the numerous legal reviews, and the results the program had produced.
    Mike’s briefing lasted about thirty minutes. I watched the
Times
men closely. They were stone-faced. I told them they could ask Mike any question they wanted. They didn’t have many. I looked directly at Sulzberger and strongly urged that he withhold the story for national security reasons. He said he would consider my request.
    Ten days later, Bill Keller called Steve to say the
Times
was going forward with the story. We had no chance for a closing argument. They had posted it on their website before Keller placed the call.
    I was disappointed in the
Times
and angry at whoever had betrayed their country by leaking the story. The Justice Department opened a criminal investigation into the disclosure of classified information. As of the summer of 2010, nobody had been prosecuted.
    The left responded with hysteria. “He’s President George Bush, not King George Bush,” one senator blustered. “The Bush administrationseems to believe it is above the law,” another said. One immediate effect of the leak was to derail the renewal of the PATRIOT