Decision Points

would face trial under the new tribunals Congress would create.
    “This bill makes the president a dictator,” one congressman proclaimed. Other lawmakers compared the conduct of our military and CIA professionals to the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.
    I was confident the American people had better judgment. Most Americans understood the need for intelligence professionals to have the tools to get information from terrorists planning attacks on our country. And they did not want Guantanamo detainees brought to the United States and tried in civilian courts with the same constitutional rights as common criminals.
    Within a month of my East Room speech, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 by a comfortable bipartisan majority. It contained everything we asked for, including authority for the tribunals to restart and for a president to use enhanced interrogation techniques, should he choose to do so.

    As I listened to my last CIA briefing the morning before President Obama’s Inauguration, I reflected on all that had happened since 9/11: the red alerts and the false alarms, the botulinum toxin we thought would kill us, and the plots we had disrupted. Years had passed, but the threat had not. The terrorists had struck Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Istanbul, Madrid, London, Amman, and Mumbai. My morning intelligence reports made clear that they were determined to attack America again.
    After the shock of 9/11, there was no legal, military, or political blueprint for confronting a new enemy that rejected all the traditional rules of war. By the time I left office, we had put in place a system of effective counterterrorism programs based on a solid legal and legislative footing.
    Of course, there are things I wish had come out differently. I am frustrated that the military tribunals moved so slowly. Even after the Military Commissions Act was passed, another lawsuit delayed the process again. By the time I left office, we had held only two trials.
    The difficulty of conducting trials made it harder to meet a goal Ihad set early in my second term: closing the prison at Guantanamo in a responsible way. While I believe opening Guantanamo after 9/11 was necessary, the detention facility had become a propaganda tool for our enemies and a distraction for our allies. I worked to find a way to close the prison without compromising security. By the time I left office, the number of detainees at Guantanamo had dropped from nearly 800 to fewer than 250. My hope is that many of those remaining will stand trial for their crimes. Some of the hardened, dangerous terrorists at Guantanamo may be very difficult to try. I knew that if I released them and they killed Americans, the blood would be on my hands. Deciding how to handle them is the toughest part of closing Guantanamo.
    In retrospect, I probably could have avoided some of the controversy and legal setbacks by seeking legislation on military tribunals, the TSP, and the CIA enhanced interrogation program as soon as they were created. If members of Congress had been required to make their decisions at the same time I did—in the immediate aftermath of 9/11—I am confident they would have overwhelmingly approved everything we requested. Yet in the case of the TSP and the CIA program, the risk of exposing operational details to the enemy was one I could not take until we had a better handle on the security situation.
    I have been troubled by the blowback against the intelligence community and Justice Department for their role in the surveillance and interrogation programs. Our intelligence officers carried out their orders with skill and courage, and they deserve our gratitude for protecting our nation. Legal officials in my administration did their best to resolve complex issues in a time of extraordinary danger to our country. Their successors are entitled to disagree with their conclusions. But criminalizing differences of legal opinion would set a terrible precedent for our democracy.
    From the beginning, I knew the public reaction to my decisions would be colored by whether there was another attack. If none happened, whatever I did would probably look like an overreaction. If we were attacked again, people would demand to know why I hadn’t done more.
    That is the nature of the presidency. Perceptions are shaped by the clarity of hindsight. In the moment of decision, you don’t have that advantage. On 9/11, I vowed that I would do what it took to protectAmerica, within