Self Comes to Mind
allowed to display even more knowledge, thus producing a well-defined protagonist, an autobiographical self. Inferences can be added, and actual interpretations of the proceedings can be produced. Still, as we shall see in the next chapter, the autobiographical self can be constructed only by means of the core self mechanism. The core self mechanism as just described, anchored in the protoself and its primordial feelings, is the central mechanism for the production of conscious minds. The complex devices required to extend the process to the autobiographical self level are dependent on the normal operation of the core self mechanism.
Would the mechanism for connecting self and object apply only to actually perceived objects and not to recalled objects? It would not. Given that when we learn about an object, we make records not just of its appearance but also of our interactions with it (our eye and head movements, our hand movements, and so forth), recalling an object encompasses recalling a varied package of memorized motor interactions. As in the case of actual motor interactions with an object, recalled or imaginary motor interactions can modify the protoself instantly. Should this idea be correct, it would explain why we do not lose consciousness when we daydream in a silent room with our eyes closed—a rather comforting thought, I guess.
In conclusion, the production of pulses of core self relative to a large number of objects interacting with the organism guarantees the production of object-related feelings. In turn, such feelings construct a robust self process that contributes to the maintenance of wakefulness. The core self pulses also confer degrees of value upon the images of the causative object, thus giving it more or less salience. This differentiation of the flowing images organizes the landscape of the mind, shaping it in relation to the needs and goals of the organism.
The Core Self State
How might the brain implement the core self state? The search takes us first to fairly local processes, involving a limited number of brain regions, and then to brain-wide processes, involving many regions simultaneously. The steps related to the protoself are not difficult to conceive neurally. The interoceptive component of the protoself is based in the upper brain stem and in the insula; the sensory portal component is based in the conventional somatosensory cortices and frontal eye fields.
The status of some of these components has to change for the core self to emerge. We have seen that when a perceived object precipitates an emotional reaction and alters the master interoceptive maps, a modification of the protoself ensues, thus altering the primordial feelings. Likewise, the sensory portal components of the protoself change when an object engages a perceptual system. As a consequence, the regions involved in making images of the body are inevitably changed at protoself sites—brain stem, insular cortex, and somatosensory cortices. These varied events generate microsequences of images that are introduced into the mind process, by which I mean that they are introduced into the image workspace of the early sensory cortices and of select regions of the brain stem, those in which feeling states are generated and modified. The microsequences of images succeed each other like beats in a pulse, irregularly but dependably, for as long as events continue to happen and the wakefulness level is maintained above threshold.
Figure 8.4: Schematic of core self mechanisms. The core self state is a composite. The main components ar e feelings of knowing and the saliency of the object. Other important components are perspective and the sense of ownership and agency .
Up to this point, in the simplest instances of core self state, there probably is no need for a central coordination device and no need at all for a single screen to display the images. The chips (the images) fall where they must (the image-making regions) and enter the mind stream as they do, in their appropriate time and order.
For the construction of the self state to be complete, however, the modified protoself must be connected with the images of the causative object. How might that happen? And how does the ensemble of these disparate sets of images get to be organized so that it constitutes a coherent scene and thus a fully fledged pulse of core self?
Timing is likely to play a role here too, when the causative object begins to be processed
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