The Devil's Code

out of his now dead body.

 28 
    M emphis is a crappy place to spend November. The sky gets cloudy and stays that way, and the days get cold, but instead of really cold, the kind of cold you can enjoy, the kind of cold that spreads snow over the landscape, Memphis gets that English bone-chilling wet cold. Instead of snow, there’s icy drizzle. You go around with your shoulders hunched and your hands in your pockets, feeling like you’re being pissed on.
    Six of us were living in three different motels around town. We’d sleep half the day and work most of the night, rotating any necessary meetings among the three motels. Bobby attended by conference line, and in the last three weeks of November, with a break for Thanksgiving when two of the guys had to go home, we got the software package together.
    We also hacked out the implications of what we were doing. That, in most ways, was the hardest part. Three of the guys wanted to write the software and turn it over to the NSA as an example of what could be done. The rest of us wanted to go ahead and do it. Bobby and I were the hardest of the hard-liners: we’d had experience with these government assholes.
    “If we don’t break it off in them, they’re gonna break it off in us,” Bobby said. “In fact, they’re doing it right now.”
    And they were. There was something of a reign of terror running through the hack community, with the bully-boys from the FBI kicking down doors and seizing equipment. Evidence of wrongdoing no longer seemed to matter. If you were an independent computer hack operating above a certain level, you were a target. The general line seemed to be the same one that the government used against gun owners, with whom I began to sympathize for the first time.
    The argument ran like this: nobody needs these big powerful computers unless he or she intends to do something wrong. Sure, stockbrokers, accountants, and suits from Microsoft and Sun might have some reason to own them, but a kid from Wyoming? That kid has no reason to own anything more powerful than a Game Boy . . . Powerful computers are prima-facie evidence that they’re doing something wrong and un-American.
    It was only a matter of time before we had Mothers Against Computer Hackers marching in Washington to make sure we wouldn’t be rolling any software whilewe’re not drinking, smoking, eating cheeseburgers, getting high, shooting guns, or having unprotected sex.
    O f the five other guys in Memphis, I knew two, Dick Enroy from Lansing, Michigan, and Larry Cole from Raleigh, North Carolina, and had vaguely heard of the other three. Bobby said they were all good guys, and Enroy and Cole were, so I took his word for it on the others. Nobody asked exactly what anybody else was doing in their computer lives, but everybody wrote good code. A guy named Chick from Columbus, Ohio, wrote a piece of switching code that was so tight and cool and elegant that I was almost embarrassed for the stuff I was writing.
    A s it happened, Corbeil’s briefcase contained mostly financial papers: he had money stashed all over the place. One nonfinancial item was a simple 3M 1.4 megabyte floppy that he carried around in a fluorescent blue Zip-disk case. The disk explained the whole OMS code thing. OMS did stand for Old Man of the Sea, the Sinbad story. The OMS code was a piece of code that sat on top of a highly intricate encryption engine inside the computers running each of the National Reconnaissance Office’s array of Keyhole 15 satellites.
    The OMS code sat on the satellite controls just like the Old Man of the Sea sat on Sinbad’s back. Whenever they needed to, Corbeil’s group could go into a satellite,order a photo scan, get it transmitted to their ground station, and then erase any sign of what had been done. Even the satellite’s internal photo-shot counter had been reset.
    The problem from our point of view was that if the NRO found out about the OMS code, they could block it. The NRO still controlled the satellites and could send up software patches and work-arounds that would effectively take the OMS out of it . . .
    The code we were writing would prevent that. The code that we were writing would give us the control of the satellites . . .
    In the arguments about whether we should write the code and give it to the NSA as a demonstration, or actually take control of the satellites, one of the guys I didn’t know, who said his name was Loomis, said that we were about to