The Science of Discworld II
in which the Grand Inquisitor encounters Christ, and explains his point of view, including why Christâs renewed message of universal love couldnât have come at a worse time and will only cause trouble. Just as the presence of Brutha, a genuine prophet, was not at all to the liking of Deacon Vorbis.
The Spanish Inquisitorsâ justification of their actions was philosophically convoluted. The purpose of their tortures was straightforward: it was to save a sinner from eternal damnation. The tortures of Hell would be far worse than anything that the Inquisitors could inflict in this world, and they would never stop. So of course they were justified in using any means whatsoever to save the poor soul from destruction. They therefore believed that their actions were justified, and in accordance with Christian principles. Not to act would have been to leave the person concerned in danger of the terrible fires of Hell.
Yes, but what if they were wrong in this belief? This is the convoluted bit. They werenât quite sure about their religious position. What were the rules? If they failed to convert one tortured heretic, would the Inquisitors burn forever? If they converted one heretic, would their souls be guaranteed a place in Heaven? The Inquisitors believed that by inflicting pain and terror without knowing the rules, they risked their own mortal souls. If they were wrong, it was they who would be immersed in the eternal flames. But they were willing to risk this enormous spiritual danger, to take upon themselves all of the consequences of their actions, should they turn out to be wrong. See how incredibly magnanimous they were being, even as they burned people alive and hacked them limb from limb with red-hot knives â¦
Clearly something is wrong. Dostoyevsky solves his own narrative problem by having Christ respond the way his own teachings would lead him to: he kisses the Inquisitor. This is an answer, of a kind, but it doesnât satisfy our analytical instincts. There is a logical flaw in the Inquisitorsâ position: what is it?
Itâs very simple. They have thought about what happens if theirbelief that their actions are justified is wrong â but only within the frame of their religion. They have not asked themselves what their position would be if their religious beliefs are false, if there is no Hell, no eternal damnation, no fire and brimstone. Then their justification would fall to bits.
Of course, if their religion is wrong, then its doctrine of brotherly love could also be wrong. It doesnât have to be: some parts might be fine, others nonsense. But to the Inquisitors it is all of one piece, it stands or falls as a whole. If they are wrong about their religion, then there is no sin, no God, and they can cheerfully torture people if they want to. It really is a nasty philosophical trap.
This is the kind of thing that happens when a big, powerful priesthood latches on to what started as one personâs awe at the universe. It is what happens when people construct elaborate verbal traps for themselves, trip over the logic, and fall headlong into them. It is where Holy Wars come from, where neighbour can inflict atrocity on neighbour merely because this otherwise reasonable person goes to a church with a round tower instead of a square one. It is the attitude that Jonathan Swift caricatured in Gulliverâs Travels , with the conflict between the big-endians and the little-endians, over which end of an egg to slice into when eating it. It is, perhaps, why so many people today are turning to unorthodox cults in an effort to find a home for their own spirituality. But cults run the same risk as the Inquisition. The only safe home for oneâs personal spirituality is oneself.
1 There doesnât seem to be a good word for âto be altruisticâ. To altru?
2 In Fisherâs day, this simplification was a great idea, because it made it possible to do the sums. Nowadays, itâs a bad idea, for the same reason. You can do them, but you canât put any faith in the answers.
3 Altruism, cooperation and love among humans are not the only examples of evolutionary overcommitment ⦠as the Librarian well knows. A banana is much better suited to being eaten by an orangutan than it needs to be. The rest of the fruit kingdom doesnât come close. Whatâs in it for other fruit, like the tomato, is that its seeds pass through the animal and are dispersed,
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