Bunker Hill

launch an attack on Boston.
    At the council of war in Cambridge on February 16, Washington made his case before his generals. They now had cannons, but they still did not have enough gunpowder to bombard the British regulars in Boston with any effectiveness. The only way to dislodge the troops, given the lack of powder, was to rely on “small arms” through “a general assault upon the town” across the ice. “[A] stroke well aimed at this critical juncture,” he insisted, “might put a final end to the war and restore peace and tranquility.” And since they had no way of knowing how long the cold might last, they had to launch the attack as soon as possible.
    According to the minister William Gordon, who appears to have spoken to Artemas Ward and perhaps others who attended the meeting on February 16, Ward “opposed the idea, saying, ‘The attack must be made with a view of bringing on an engagement, or of driving the enemy out of Boston and either end will be answered much better by possessing Dorchester Heights.’” This, of course, was what Ward had been saying since August, and it was not what Washington wanted to hear now that the harbor was frozen in February. Even worse, Washington’s trusted adjutant, General Horatio Gates, agreed with Ward, maintaining that “our present army has neither the numbers, the arm[s] nor the discipline necessary to secure success in the assault of Boston” and that “our defeat may risk the entire loss of the liberties of America forever.” The vote of Washington’s generals was unanimous; instead of attacking Boston across the ice, they should occupy Dorchester Heights.
    According to Gordon, “the commander-in-chief could not refrain from showing that he was greatly dissatisfied.” Stifling his anger and frustration, he agreed to support Ward’s plan to “possess Dorchester Heights, with a view of drawing the enemy out.” As it so happened, Ward, “unknown to General Washington . . . had been for some time collecting fascines, gabions, etc., . . . in expectation that the same would be wanted for this purpose.” Gordon recounted how Washington, no doubt somewhat sullenly, left “the conducting of the business [at Dorchester Heights] . . . to General Ward.”
    Washington, however, refused to wholly abandon his plan to attack and destroy the British in Boston. If after the Americans occupied Dorchester Heights, the British should do as they did on June 17, 1775, and launch an assault on the hastily constructed fortifications, Washington proposed that they then launch a backdoor assault of their own on the western side of Boston, using boats to transport soldiers from Roxbury and Cambridge. Since a significant portion of the British force would be engaged in the attack on Dorchester, the odds would now be in the Americans’ favor. With luck, they would have succeeded in taking the city before the British troops had a chance to return from Dorchester Heights.
    Even Ward and Gates appear to have believed that this modified plan to take Boston had merit, but there was one general who insisted that such an attack “would most assuredly produce only defeat and disgrace to the American army.” William Heath had been there with Joseph Warren during the British retreat from Lexington, and he now maintained that even if the enemy was “induce[d] to make a sally” from Boston, General Howe could be counted on to “provide for the defense of the town.” The Americans in Cambridge would not simply row across the Back Bay to the shores of an undefended city; they would most assuredly face stiff and potentially devastating opposition. To expect these soldiers to cross a mile and a half of open water in the face of British artillery was ludicrous; to expect them to “effect a landing . . . under such a tremendous fire” was madness. Washington’s unnecessarily aggressive plan would in all likelihood turn a victory into a humiliating defeat.
    Whether or not Washington’s unceasing six-month campaign to oust the British by force had finally worn down his council of war, the majority of the generals voted in support of his latest proposal. At long last, a committee was formed to draw up a detailed plan for attacking Boston.
    Washington had gotten at least a portion of what he wanted, but he remained resentful that his original plan to attack the city across the ice had been rejected. As late as February 26, he wrote Joseph Reed, “But behold! though