Decision Points

months in power, Maliki had matured as a leader. He had endured death threats, potential coups, and numerous congressional delegations traveling to Iraq to berate him. A few days before our scheduled summit in Jordan, radical Shia leader Moqtada al Sadr threatened to withdraw his supporters from the government if the prime minister met with me. Maliki came anyway.
    “Here is my plan,” he said proudly as he handed me a document with the new seal of the Iraqi government on the cover. Inside was an ambitious proposal to retake Baghdad with Iraqi forces. I knew his army and police were not ready for such a major undertaking. What mattered was that Maliki recognized the problem of sectarian violence and was showing a willingness to lead.
    “Americans want to know whether your plan allows us to go against both Sunni and Shia killers,” I asked.
    “We don’t distinguish by ethnicity,” he replied.
    I asked to meet with the prime minister alone. Maliki seemed ready to confront the violence. I decided to test his commitment by raising the prospect of a surge.
    “The political pressure to abandon Iraq is enormous,” I said, “but I am willing to resist that pressure if you are willing to make the hard choices.”
    I continued: “I’m willing to commit tens of thousands of additional American troops to help you retake Baghdad. But you need to give me certain assurances.”
    I ran through the list: He had to commit more Iraqi forces, and they had to show up. There could be no political interference in our joint military operations—no more forbidding us from going into Shia neighborhoods. He would have to confront the Shia militias, including Sadr’s army. And as security improved, he had to make progress on political reconciliation among Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds.
    On every point, Maliki gave me his word that he would follow through.
    On the flight home from Jordan, I thought about the options for anew strategy. Accelerating the handover to the Iraqis was not a viable approach. That sounded a lot like our current strategy, which was failing.
    I didn’t think it was practical to withdraw from the cities and let the violence burn out. I couldn’t ask our troops to stand back and watch innocent people being slaughtered by extremists. I worried Iraq could be broken so badly that it would be impossible to put back together.
    The surge option brought risks of its own. Increasing our troop levels would be deeply unpopular at home. The fighting would be tough, and casualties could be high. If Maliki let us down, we might not be able to stem the violence.
    After seeing Maliki, I believed we could count on his support. The surge was our best chance, maybe our last chance, to accomplish our objectives in Iraq.

    Over weeks of intense discussion in November and December, most of the national security team came to support the surge. Dick Cheney, Bob Gates , Josh Bolten , and Steve Hadley and his NSC warriors were behind the new approach. Condi would be, too, so long as the plan didn’t send more troops under the same old strategy.
    On a decision this controversial and important, it was essential to have unity. Congress and the press would probe for any rift within the administration. If they found one, they would exploit it to justify their opposition and block the plan. To reach that consensus, one more group needed to be on board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff .
    Established by the National Security Act of 1947, the Joint Chiefs included the heads of each service branch, plus a chairman and vice-chairman. The chiefs are not part of the chain of command, so they have no direct responsibility for military operations. A key part of their role is to advocate the health and strength of our armed forces. By law, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the president’s principal military adviser.
    The chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 2006 was General Pete Pace. Pete was the first Marine to serve as chairman and one of the great officers of his generation. As a young lieutenant in Vietnam, Pete led a platoon that endured heavy fighting. For the rest of his career, he carried the photosof the Marines who gave their lives under his command. When he took office as chairman, he made a point of telling me their names. He never forgot them, or the cost of war.
    Pete had launched a strategy review within the Joint Chiefs, and I asked Steve Hadley to make sure the surge concept had a place in their discussions. I decided to go see the chiefs at