Decision Points

the Pentagon to listen to their thoughts in person.
    Two days before the meeting, Pete came to the Oval Office. He told me I would hear a number of concerns from the chiefs, but they were prepared to support the surge. He also gave Steve an estimate on how many troops might be needed to make a difference: five brigades, about twenty thousand Americans.
    On December 13, 2006, I walked into the Tank, the Joint Chiefs’ secure wood-paneled conference room at the Pentagon. Coming to their territory was a way to show my respect. I opened by telling them I was there to hear their opinions and ask their advice.

    Discussing the surge strategy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Tank.
White House/Eric Draper
    I went around the table one by one. The chiefs laid out their concerns. They worried about Maliki’s level of commitment. They felt other agencies of the government needed to contribute more in Iraq. They questioned whether the demands of a surge would leave us unprepared for other contingencies, such as a flare-up on the Korean Peninsula.
    Their overriding worry was that a troop increase would “break the military” by putting too much strain on service members and their families. Many of our troops in Iraq were serving their second or third tours in the country. To make the surge possible, we would have to extend some tours from twelve to fifteen months. The effect on recruitment, morale, training, preparedness, and military families could be profound.
    Army Chief of Staff Pete Schoomaker and Marine Commandant James Conway recommended an increase in the size of their services. They believed an expansion would ease the stress on our forces and help ensure we were ready for potential conflicts elsewhere in the world. I liked the idea and promised to consider it.
    At the end of the meeting, I summarized my thinking. “I share your concern about breaking the military,” I said. “The surest way to break the military would be to lose in Iraq.”

    My initial plan was to announce the new Iraq strategy a week or two before Christmas. But as the date approached, I concluded we needed more time. I wanted Bob Gates , who was sworn in as secretary of defense on December 18, to visit Iraq.
    Two days before Christmas, Bob came to see me at Camp David. He told me he had visited with Maliki, who had refined his plan for an Iraqi surge to match ours. Maliki would declare martial law, deploy three additional Iraqi brigades to Baghdad, appoint a military governor, and name two deputy commanders with free rein to go after extremists of any sectarian background. Bob had also decided on his recommendation for a new commander. It would be General David Petraeus. We agreed to nominate General Casey for a promotion to Army chief of staff. George had a long and distinguished record of service, and his experience would benefit the Army. I also wanted to make clear that I did not blame him for the problems in Iraq.
    The final question to resolve was the size of the surge. Some in the military proposed that we commit two additional brigades initially—a mini-surge of about ten thousand troops—with the possibility of sending up to three more brigades later. Pete Pace reported that General Petraeus and General Ray Odierno, the number-two commander in Iraq, wanted all five brigades committed up front.
    If our commanders on the ground wanted the full force, they would get it. I decided to send five brigades to Baghdad, plus two additional Marine battalions to Anbar Province. We would embed our troops in Iraqi formations, so that we could mentor the Iraqis on the battlefield and prepare the Iraqis to take more responsibility after the surge. Finally, I would accept three key recommendations from the Joint Chiefs. Condi would lead a surge in civilian resources. I would obtain public assurances from Prime Minister Maliki about our troops’ freedom to maneuver. And I would call on Congress to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps by ninety thousand forces.
    On January 4, 2007, I held a secure videoconference with Maliki. “A lot of people here don’t think we can succeed. I do,” I told him. “I’ll putmy neck out if you put out yours.” Two days later, he addressed the Iraqi people and signaled his commitment to the surge. “The Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of sectarian or political affiliation,” he said.
    The decision had been tough, but I was confident that I had made