Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris

Childers,
Nazi Voter,
203.
    336 . See Allen, 322, for the high percentage of Nazi meetings in the Lower Saxon town of Northeim that consisted of little beyond pageantry.
    337 .
RSA,
V/1, 216–19; Domarus, 115; Z.A.B. Zeman,
Nazi Propaganda,
2nd edn, London/New York, 1973, 31.
    338 . Hamilton, 326.
    339 .
RSA,
V/1, 210–94; Deuerlein,
Aufstieg,
394; Domarus, 114–20.
    340 . Hanfstaengl, 15
Jahre,
267.
    341 .
RSA,
V/1, 216–19; Domarus, 115–17 (Adolf-Hitler-Schallplatte: ‘Appell an die Nation’).
    342 . Falter,
et al., Wahlen,
44. The turn-out, 84.1 per cent, was the largest for a Reichstag election during the period of the Weimar democracy.
    343 .
TBJG,
1.2, 211 (1 August 1932). The published ‘Kaiserhof’ version had a more optimistic tone: Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
135–6 (31 July 1932). The following day, in his unpublished diary entry for 2 August, Goebbels again expressed Hitler’s agreement that the time for power had arrived. The only alternative was ‘sharpest opposition’. There could be no more question of toleration of the Papen government
(TBJG,
I.2, 212–13).
    344 .
TBJG,
I.2, 214 (3 August 1932).
    345 .
TBJG,
I.2, 215 (5 August 1932).
    346 .
TBJG,
I.2, 217 (7 August 1932).
    347 . See Winkler,
Weimar,
509.
    348 . Thilo Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers gegenüber der NSDAP 1932’,
VfZ,
6 (1958), 86–118, here 89.
    349 . Hubatsch,
Hindenburg,
335–8, Nr.87 (Meissner’s minutes from 11 August 1932).
    350 . Winkler,
Weimar,
509.
    351 .
TBJG,
I.2, 218 (9 August 1932).
    352 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
140 (8 August 1932);
TBJG,
I.2, 218.
    353 . Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 93–8; Winkler,
Weimar,
509–10.
    354 .
TBJG,
I.2, 221 (11 August 1932). For Gayl’s speech, see Eberhard Kolb and Wolfram Pyta, ‘Die Staatsnotstandsplanung unter Papen und Schleicher’, in Heinrich August Winkler (ed.),
Die deutsche Staatskrise 1930–1933,
Munich, 1992, 155–81, here 160.
    355 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
142–4 (11–12 August 1932);
TBJG,
I.2, 222–3; see also Papen, 195.
    356 . Papen, 195–7; Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
144 (13 August 1932);
TBJG,
I.2, 224.
    357 .Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
144–5 (13 August 1932);
TBJG,
I.2, 224.
    358 . Hubatsch, 338–9, Nr.88; Deuerlein,
Aufstieg,
397–8; Papen, 197. Hitler objected to Meissner’s wording of the official communiqué and within hours dispatched his own version, put together, he said, together with Frick and Röhm immediately after they had returned from the meeting. This stressed Hitler’s denial that he would demand all cabinet seats for his party, if he were given the leadership. It mainly, however, concentrated on the subsequent exchange in the corridor and on Hitler’s resentment that he had been called to the meeting when, in fact, the decision had already been taken in advance of it by Hindenburg. Unsurprisingly, neither Papen nor the Reich Chancellery were prepared to alter anything in the published communiqué (IfZ, Fa 296, Bl.165–71).
    359 . IfZ, Fa 296, Bl.169, ‘Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei am 13.8.32’, signed by Röhm, Frick and Hitler.
    360 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
145 (13 August 1932);
TBJG,
I.2, 225.
    361 . See Lüdecke, 351–2.
    362 . See Winkler,
Weimar,
511–12.

CHAPTER 10: LEVERED INTO POWER
    1 . For the splits in élite strategies and aims during the final phase of the Weimar Republic, see the contributions by Henry Ashby Turner, Jürgen John and Wolfgang Zollitsch (together with the subsequent discussion) in Heinrich August Winkler (ed.),
Die deutsche Staatskrise 1930–1933,
Munich, 1992, 205–62.
    2 . A point emphasized by James, ‘Economic Reasons for the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, in Kershaw (ed.),
Weimar: Why did German Democracy Fail?,
30–57, here 55; see also the perceptive analysis by Gerald D. Feldmann, ‘Der 30 Januar. 1933 und die politische Kultur von Weimar’, in Winkler,
Staatskrise, 263–76.
Eberhard Jäckel is adamant that Hitler’s takeover of power did constitute a ‘works accident’, though on his own analysis
(Das deutsche Jahrhundert,
126–58) of the behaviour of the national-conservative, pro-monarchist élites it was at the very least an accident waiting to happen.
    3 . Letter from Wilhelm Keppler to Kurt von Schröder, 26 December 1932, cit. in Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 86.
    4 . Winkler,
Weimar,
511; Schulz,
Von Brüning zu Hitler, 964;
Domarus, 123–4.
    5 . Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 86–7.
    6 . Joachim von Ribbentrop,
The Ribbentrop