Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris

Mommsen,
Die verspielte Freiheit,
476.
    41 . Kolb and Pyta, 166; Winkler,
Weimar,
528.
    42 . Broadcasting was controlled by the government, which allowed little time for political broadcasts. The Nazis had had no access to the radio before the summer of 1932 (Zeman, 31).
    43 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
165 (16 September 1932), 167 (20 September 1932), for the quotation;
TBJG, I.2,
243–4, 246–7. For extensive reports from regional and local party organizations of financial difficulties hampering the campaign, see Childers, ‘Limits’, in
The Formation of the Nazi Constituency, 1919–1933 ,
236–8.
    44 . Lüdecke, 438.
    45 . Domarus, 137. Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
176 (4 October 1932);
TBJG,
I.2, 254–5 (5 October 1932). See also Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
174 (2 October 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 252 for Hitler’s conveying of optimism to others, and Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I87 (28 October 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 265 where Hitler was said to be ‘very certain of victory’.
    46 . Lüdecke, 461–2, 469, 475–6.
    47 . Lüdecke, 476.
    48 . Lüdecke, 479. Above account based on Lüdecke, 475–9; Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I74 (2 October 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 252.
    49 . Deuerlein,
Aufstieg,
402–3 notes forty-nine speeches, but does not include Regensburg on 5 November; Domarus, 138–42 has forty-seven, including Regensburg, but omitting Gummersbach, Betzdorf-Walmenrot, and Limburg; Hauner, 85, lists forty-seven but omits Schweinfurt, Würzburg and Betzdorf-Walmenrot.
    50 . Maser,
Hitler,
317 and n.
    51 .Gun,
Eva Braun-Hitler,
55–7. Hoffman, 161–2, dates the incident to summer 1932. For other suicide attempts of women who knew Hitler, see Maser,
Hitler,
313.
    52 . Domarus, 141.
    53 . VB, 14 October 1932, IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel 1 Folder 13.
    54 . VB, 14 October 1932, IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel 1 Folder 13.
    55 . IfZ, MA-731, NSDAP-HA, Reel 1 Folder 13, Pd Hof, 15 October 1932.
    56 . Domarus, 138.
    57 . Above quotations from IfZ, MA-1220, HA, Reel IA Folder 13.
    58 . IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel I Folder 13.
    59 . See Childers, ‘Limits’, 236, 246–51.
    60 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I91 (2 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 268. Goebbels may, like Hitler, have been deceived into over-optimism by the type of reception he had at his meetings. After a speech in Stettin on 31 October, he wrote in his diary: ‘The mood is excellent everywhere. We are making mighty inroads.’ His adjoining comment revealed, however, his concern: ‘If it goes on like this, 6 November won’t be all that bad.’ And the next day he was already consoling himself for an impending defeat: ‘It’s not all that bad if we lose a few million votes’ (Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I90 (31 October 1932, 1 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 267).
    61 . IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel 1 Folder 13, Pd Nbg, 14 October 1932.
    62 . BHStA, MA 102144, RPvNB/OP, 19 October 1932.
    63 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I95 (5 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 271. Even in early October, Gregor Strasser had predicted a loss of forty seats (Stachura,
Strasser,
I04).
    64 . Falter
et al., Wahlen,
41, 44.
    65 . Falter,
Hitlers Wähler,
I09.
    66 . Falter, ‘National Socialist Mobilisation’, 219.
    67 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I96 (6 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 272.
    68 . See Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I92 (2 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 269 where Goebbels had spoken of the lack of funding in the campaign as ‘a chronic sickness’. On the very day before the election, he noted, it had been possible to drum up 10,000 Marks ‘at the last minute’, which were immediately thrown into the last efforts of propaganda (Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I95 (5 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 271). The DΝVP’s propaganda had been better funded and, it was accepted, as a result quantitatively superior (Childers, ‘Limits’, 238).
    69 . Childers, ‘Limits’, 243–4; and see Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I96 (6 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 272.
    70 . BHStA, MA 102151, RPvUF, 21 September 1932.
    71 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I96 (6 November 1932),
ΤΒJG,
I.2, 272.
    72 . Childers, ‘Limits’, 238–42.
    73 . The strike, called by the Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (Revolutionäre Gewerkschafts-Opposition (RGO)) – the factory-cell organization of the KPD – was in protest at wage reductions imposed on Berlin transport workers. Initiallyswingeing, these had been reduced to more modest levels, but were still sufficient to provoke the Communists into declaring a strike, opposed by the SPD-linked unions, but backed by the NSBO. The strike began on 3 November and was broken off by the strikers four days