Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris

later. The underground was brought to a complete standstill; trams and buses attempting to leave the depots were in the main halted by pickets. There was a good deal of public disorder, including clashes between strikers and the police which ended with three dead and eight injured as police shot into a crowd. See Winkler,
Weimar,
533–5. Goebbels, overjoyed, described the mood as ‘revolutionary’ (Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I94 (4 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 270). For the KPD, the strike probably played a part in the increased vote in the November election, and also shored up the already existent over-confidence in the party’s ability to cope with a National Socialist government. (Christian Striefler,
Kampf um die Macht. Kommunisten und Nationalsozialisten am Ende der Weimarer Republik,
Berlin, 1993, 177–86).
    74 . Childers, ‘Limits’, 238.
    75 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I92 (2 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 268–9.
    76 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I94 (4 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 270.
    77 . Childers, ‘Limits’, 240.
    78 . Jochmann,
Nationalsozialismus und Revolution,
416 (3 November 1932, 6 November 1932).
    79 . Jochmann,
Nationalsozialismus und Revolution,
417 (7 November 1932, 9 November 1932).
    80 . Winkler,
Weimar,
536–7.
    81 .
TBJG,
I.2, 274 (9 November 1932).
    82 . IMT, vol.35, 223–30, Docs. 633-D and 634-D; Domarus, 144–8;
AdR, Kabinett von Papen,
ii.952–60; Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
I99 (9 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 276; Papen, 212–13; Bracher,
Auflösung, 659–60
and n.31; Winkler,
Weimar,
543.
    83 .
AdR, Kabinett von Papen,
ii.951–2 (meeting of Papen and Schäffer, 16 November 1932). See also Winkler,
Weimar,
541, 543.
    84 . Hubatsch,
Hindenburg,
353.
    85 . Papen, 214; Winkler,
Weimar,
543.
    86 . Printed in Eberhard Czichon,
Wer verhalf Hitler zur Macht? Zum Anteil der deutschen Industrie an der Zerstörung der Weimarer Republik,
Cologne (1967), 3rd edn, 1972, 69–71.
    87 . Based on Turner,
German Big Business,
303–4; see also Winkler,
Weimar,
540–41.
    88 . Lüdecke, 413.
    89 . Hubatsch, 350–52; Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
206 (20 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 282.
    90 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
207 (20 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 282.
    91 . Hubatsch, 350–52, here 352; Domarus, 149; Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
207–8 (20 November 1932, 21 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 282–3.
    92 . Domarus, 150 (21 November 1932).
    93 .Hubatsch, 353–6; Domarus, 151: communiqué of the second discussion of Hindenburg and Hitler on the morning of 21 November 1932.
    94 . Hubatsch, 354–5; Domarus, 152 (21 November 1932); Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
208 (21 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 283.
    95 . Hubatsch, 356–7; Domarus, 153–4 (22 November 1932); Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
208 (23 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 283.
    96 . Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
209 (23 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 284.
    97 . Hubatsch, 358–61; Domarus, 154–7 (23 November 1932).
    98 . Domarus, 157 n.274.
    99 . Hubatsch, 361–2; Domarus, 158 (24 November 1932).
    100 . Domarus, 159, Hitler’s final letter on the matter, written on 24 November; Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
209–10 (24 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 284.
    101 . Hubatsch, 365–6.
    102 . Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 104–5; Goebbels,
Kaiserhof,
209 (23 November 1932),
TBJG,
I.2, 284.
    103 . Stachura,
Strasser,
I07. Turner,
Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power,
25, states that Schleicher’s hope was not to split the NSDAP but to win the backing of the whole party for such a strategy. He was sufficient of a realist, however, to recognize that, without Hitler’s blessing, this was hardly likely.
    104 .
TBJG,
I.2, 288 (2 December 1932); Domarus, 161. Hitler, in Weimar on account of the Thuringian local elections
(Gemeindewahlen),
had declined to travel to Berlin to meet Schleicher.
    105 . Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 105 and n.44.
    106 . Papen, 216–23; Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 105–7, 110–11 and n.65; Winkler,
Weimar,
547–50, 553–5; see also Kolb and Pyta, 170–77. Schleicher’s expectations of support from the SPD would probably have proved illusory, though the party thought of him as a lesser evil than Papen or Hitler. He did, however, have good connections with the Reichsbanner. And the trade unions were inclined to give Schleicher a chance.
    107 . Peter D. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”: Strasser, Hitler, and National Socialism, 1930–1932’, in Stachura,
Shaping,
88–130, here 88.
    108 . Hanfstaengl, 15
Jahre,
281. The quoted comments of Spengler are a further