In Europe

that he was still a man to be reckoned with.
    In spring 1991, Konrád had written about the insecurity of his fellow Eastern Europeans in the face of a capitalism they had not grown up with, about their aggrieved sense of self-importance, and about the ‘suspect talents’ they were beginning to apply. ‘Before long, anyone who isn't angry at one of our neighbouring countries will be suspected of treason. Hate is standing in the wings, waiting only to be told who to pounce upon.’
    Konrád sensed that tension quite acutely. On 25 June, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Tito's Yugoslavia had ceased to exist. Miložsević placed all his bets on the formation of a new and powerful Balkan state, an ethnically pure Greater Serbia into which large sections of Croatia and Bosnia were also to be incorporated in due course. That spring, extremist Serbs in Croatia seceded and formed their own ministate, the Serb Republic of Krajina. From the start, they displayed two traits that would prove formative for all conflicts to come in former Yugoslavia: an extreme predilection for local autonomy, and great enthusiasm for the use of violence. It was in Krajina that the first of those militias were set up – by people including the Rambo-esque žZeljko Ražznatović, also known as Arkan – which would later play such a deadly role in Bosnia.
    Meanwhile, the protagonists of the drama, Miložsević and the Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman, started in on a series of secret consultations at Karadjordjevo, one of Tito's favourite holiday villas. Later, at Split, they even included Bosnian-Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović in their talks. They were trying to circumvent a war, and at the same time Miložsević proposed to Tudjman that they more or less divide Bosnia between them along ethnic lines. Izetbegović expressed interest in that proposal as well; he was hoping to work together with Tudjman against the Serbs, and didnot wish to offend him. Whatever agreement they finally reached – the arrangements between Miložsević and Tudjman in particular are still shrouded in mist – within a few days their accord was overtaken by the facts. A Serb paramilitary force attacked a Croatian police post, the first casualties fell, and the war had begun. In July 1991, the Yugoslav Army openly sided with the Serb rebels in Krajina.
    For the first time since the Second World War, campaigns of ethnic cleansing were once again taking place within Europe: approximately 500,000 Croatians were driven out of Krajina, around 250,000 Serbs in Croatia lost their jobs and were forced to flee for their lives. The Gypsy population was persecuted as well: more than 50,000 eventually left the country.
    In autumn 1991, the war came close to Novi Sad. The picturesque town of Vukovar on the Danube, an hour away, was besieged for months. Panic broke out among the young people of Novi Sad. Schools, university canteens, Café Sax: they all emptied out. Many of the boys fled to the stands of willow along the river, and the girls went there in the evening to bolster their spirits with food and blankets and other comforts. These days people still whisper about the orgies that went on there; no one gave a damn any more, they were all going to die anyway, they thought.
    The EU, full of optimism and self-confidence, now adopted the role of mediator. The Common Market, after all, was proceeding as planned, the Treaty of Maastricht was on its way, there were far-reaching plans for a common currency and a common security policy. This would be the first test case for the community's new joint foreign policy. Three representatives – the Luxembourger Jacques Poos, the Dutchman Hans van den Broek and the Italian Gianni De Michelis – travelled to Zagreb and Belgrade to meet with the warring factions and, as the negotiators were still frequently saying, to ‘bang their heads together’.
    Little attention was paid at that point to the structural and historical contexts of the conflict. For years, as the closely involved BBC journalists Laura Silber and Allan Little wrote, the European negotiators acted as though the conflict had been caused only by the vaguely delineated ‘temperament’ of the Balkans, ‘an irresistible southern Slavic tendency –be that cultural, be that genetic – towards fratricide.’ The warring groups had only to be convinced of the foolishness of war, nothing else was needed to bring about peace. What they overlooked,