The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

intercourse;
for he contributes nothing and finds fault with everything. But
relaxation and amusement are thought to be a necessary element in
life.
    The means in life that have been described, then, are three in
number, and are all concerned with an interchange of words and
deeds of some kind. They differ, however, in that one is concerned
with truth; and the other two with pleasantness. Of those concerned
with pleasure, one is displayed in jests, the other in the general
social intercourse of life.
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9
    Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a
feeling than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a
kind of fear of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that
produced by fear of danger; for people who feel disgraced blush,
and those who fear death turn pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in
a sense bodily conditions, which is thought to be characteristic of
feeling rather than of a state of character.
    The feeling is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For
we think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame
because they live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but
are restrained by shame; and we praise young people who are prone
to this feeling, but an older person no one would praise for being
prone to the sense of disgrace, since we think he should not do
anything that need cause this sense. For the sense of disgrace is
not even characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent on
bad actions (for such actions should not be done; and if some
actions are disgraceful in very truth and others only according to
common opinion, this makes no difference; for neither class of
actions should be done, so that no disgrace should be felt); and it
is a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful
action. To be so constituted as to feel disgraced if one does such
an action, and for this reason to think oneself good, is absurd;
for it is for voluntary actions that shame is felt, and the good
man will never voluntarily do bad actions. But shame may be said to
be conditionally a good thing; if a good man does such actions, he
will feel disgraced; but the virtues are not subject to such a
qualification. And if shamelessness-not to be ashamed of doing base
actions-is bad, that does not make it good to be ashamed of doing
such actions. Continence too is not virtue, but a mixed sort of
state; this will be shown later. Now, however, let us discuss
justice.

Nicomachean Ethics, Book V
    Translated by W. D. Ross
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1
    With regards to justice and injustice we must (1) consider what
kind of actions they are concerned with, (2) what sort of mean
justice is, and (3) between what extremes the just act is
intermediate. Our investigation shall follow the same course as the
preceding discussions.
    We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of
character which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes
them act justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by
injustice that state which makes them act unjustly and wish for
what is unjust. Let us too, then, lay this down as a general basis.
For the same is not true of the sciences and the faculties as of
states of character. A faculty or a science which is one and the
same is held to relate to contrary objects, but a state of
character which is one of two contraries does not produce the
contrary results; e.g. as a result of health we do not do what is
the opposite of healthy, but only what is healthy; for we say a man
walks healthily, when he walks as a healthy man would.
    Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary,
and often states are recognized from the subjects that exhibit
them; for (A) if good condition is known, bad condition also
becomes known, and (B) good condition is known from the things that
are in good condition, and they from it. If good condition is
firmness of flesh, it is necessary both that bad condition should
be flabbiness of flesh and that the wholesome should be that which
causes firmness in flesh. And it follows for the most part that if
one contrary is ambiguous the other also will be ambiguous; e.g. if
‘just’ is so, that ‘unjust’ will be so too.
    Now ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ seem to be ambiguous, but because
their different meanings approach near to one another the ambiguity
escapes notice and is not obvious as it is, comparatively, when the
meanings are far apart, e.g.