The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

is an uglier character
(it is not the capacity that makes the boaster, but the purpose;
for it is in virtue of his state of character and by being a man of
a certain kind that he is boaster); as one man is a liar because he
enjoys the lie itself, and another because he desires reputation or
gain. Now those who boast for the sake of reputation claim such
qualities as will praise or congratulation, but those whose object
is gain claim qualities which are of value to one’s neighbours and
one’s lack of which is not easily detected, e.g. the powers of a
seer, a sage, or a physician. For this reason it is such things as
these that most people claim and boast about; for in them the
above-mentioned qualities are found.
    Mock-modest people, who understate things, seem more attractive
in character; for they are thought to speak not for gain but to
avoid parade; and here too it is qualities which bring reputation
that they disclaim, as Socrates used to do. Those who disclaim
trifling and obvious qualities are called humbugs and are more
contemptible; and sometimes this seems to be boastfulness, like the
Spartan dress; for both excess and great deficiency are boastful.
But those who use understatement with moderation and understate
about matters that do not very much force themselves on our notice
seem attractive. And it is the boaster that seems to be opposed to
the truthful man; for he is the worse character.
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8
    Since life includes rest as well as activity, and in this is
included leisure and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind
of intercourse which is tasteful; there is such a thing as
sayingand again listening to—what one should and as one should. The
kind of people one is speaking or listening to will also make a
difference. Evidently here also there is both an excess and a
deficiency as compared with the mean. Those who carry humour to
excess are thought to be vulgar buffoons, striving after humour at
all costs, and aiming rather at raising a laugh than at saying what
is becoming and at avoiding pain to the object of their fun; while
those who can neither make a joke themselves nor put up with those
who do are thought to be boorish and unpolished. But those who joke
in a tasteful way are called ready-witted, which implies a sort of
readiness to turn this way and that; for such sallies are thought
to be movements of the character, and as bodies are discriminated
by their movements, so too are characters. The ridiculous side of
things is not far to seek, however, and most people delight more
than they should in amusement and in jestinly. and so even buffoons
are called ready-witted because they are found attractive; but that
they differ from the ready-witted man, and to no small extent, is
clear from what has been said.
    To the middle state belongs also tact; it is the mark of a
tactful man to say and listen to such things as befit a good and
well-bred man; for there are some things that it befits such a man
to say and to hear by way of jest, and the well-bred man’s jesting
differs from that of a vulgar man, and the joking of an educated
man from that of an uneducated. One may see this even from the old
and the new comedies; to the authors of the former indecency of
language was amusing, to those of the latter innuendo is more so;
and these differ in no small degree in respect of propriety. Now
should we define the man who jokes well by his saying what is not
unbecoming to a well-bred man, or by his not giving pain, or even
giving delight, to the hearer? Or is the latter definition, at any
rate, itself indefinite, since different things are hateful or
pleasant to different people? The kind of jokes he will listen to
will be the same; for the kind he can put up with are also the kind
he seems to make. There are, then, jokes he will not make; for the
jest is a sort of abuse, and there are things that lawgivers forbid
us to abuse; and they should, perhaps, have forbidden us even to
make a jest of such. The refined and well-bred man, therefore, will
be as we have described, being as it were a law to himself.
    Such, then, is the man who observes the mean, whether he be
called tactful or ready-witted. The buffoon, on the other hand, is
the slave of his sense of humour, and spares neither himself nor
others if he can raise a laugh, and says things none of which a man
of refinement would say, and to some of which he would not even
listen. The boor, again, is useless for such social