The Complete Aristotle (eng.)
Analytics (2 Books), translated by G. R. G. Mure
Topics (8 Books), translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge
Sophistical Refutations, translated by W. A.
Pickard-Cambridge
Part 2: Universal Physics
Physics (8 Books), translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye
On the Heavens (4 Books), translated by J. L. Stocks
On Gerneration and Corruption (2 Books), translated by H. H.
Joachim
Meteorology (4 Books), translated by E. W. Webster
Part 3: Human Physics
On the Soul (3 Books), translated by J. A. Smith
On Sense and the Sensible, translated by J. I. Beare
On Memory and Reminiscence, translated by J. I. Beare
On Sleep and Sleeplessness, translated by J. I. Beare
On Dreams, translated by J. I. Beare
On Prophesying by Dreams, translated by J. I. Beare
On Longevity and Shortness of Life, translated by G. R. T.
Ross
On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration, translated
by G. R. T. Ross
Part 4: Animal Physics
The History of Animals (9 Books), translated by D'Arcy Wentworth
Thompson
On the Parts of Animals (4 Books), translated by William
Ogle
On the Motion of Animals, translated by A. S. L. Farquharson
On the Gait of Animals, translated by A. S. L. Farquharson
On the Generation of Animals (5 Books), translated by Arthur
Platt
Part 5: Metaphysics
(15 Books), translated by W. D. Ross
Part 6: Ethics and Politics
Nicomachean Ethics (10 Books), translated by W. D. Ross
Politics (8 Books), translated by Benjamin Jowett
The Athenian Constitution, translated by Sir Frederic G.
Kenyon
Part 7: Aesthetic Writings
Rhetoric (3 Books), translated by W. Rhys Roberts
Poetics, translated by S. H. Butcher
eBooks@Adelaide, 2007
Steve Thomas
Part 1
Logic (Organon)
Categories
Translated by E. M. Edghill
1
Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have
a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs
for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay
claim to the name ‘animal’; yet these are equivocally so named,
for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding
with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what
sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be
appropriate to that case only.
On the other hand, things are said to be named ‘univocally’
which have both the name and the definition answering to the name
in common. A man and an ox are both ‘animal’, and these are
univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the
definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in
what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would
be identical with that in the other.
Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’, which derive their
name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus
the grammarian derives his name from the word ‘grammar’, and the
courageous man from the word ‘courage’.
2
Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the
latter are such expressions as ‘the man runs’, ‘the man wins’; of
the former ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’.
Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are
never present in a subject. Thus ‘man’ is predicable of the
individual man, and is never present in a subject.
By being ‘present in a subject’ I do not mean present as parts
are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from
the said subject.
Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never
predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of
grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable
of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the
body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never
predicable of anything.
Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and
present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human
mind, it is predicable of grammar.
There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in
a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man
or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which
is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable
of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such
being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical
knowledge is present in a subject.
3
When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is
predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of
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