The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

sufficiently equalized by a certain number of marriages
being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds
this to be the case in existing states. But greater care will be
required than now; for among ourselves, whatever may be the number
of citizens, the property is always distributed among them, and
therefore no one is in want; but, if the property were incapable of
division as in the Laws, the supernumeraries, whether few or many,
would get nothing. One would have thought that it was even more
necessary to limit population than property; and that the limit
should be fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the
children, and of sterility in married persons. The neglect of this
subject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing
cause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is the parent of
revolution and crime. Pheidon the Corinthian, who was one of the
most ardent legislators, thought that the families and the number
of citizens ought to remain the same, although originally all the
lots may have been of different sizes: but in the Laws the opposite
principle is maintained. What in our opinion is the right
arrangement will have to be explained hereafter.
    There is another omission in the Laws: Socrates does not tell us
how the rulers differ from their subjects; he only says that they
should be related as the warp and the woof, which are made out of
different wools. He allows that a man’s whole property may be
increased fivefold, but why should not his land also increase to a
certain extent? Again, will the good management of a household be
promoted by his arrangement of homesteads? For he assigns to each
individual two homesteads in separate places, and it is difficult
to live in two houses.
    The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy nor
oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is usually
called a polity, and is composed of the heavy-armed soldiers. Now,
if he intended to frame a constitution which would suit the
greatest number of states, he was very likely right, but not if he
meant to say that this constitutional form came nearest to his
first or ideal state; for many would prefer the Lacedaemonian, or,
possibly, some other more aristocratic government. Some, indeed,
say that the best constitution is a combination of all existing
forms, and they praise the Lacedaemonian because it is made up of
oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king forming the monarchy,
and the council of elders the oligarchy while the democratic
element is represented by the Ephors; for the Ephors are selected
from the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be a
tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common meals and
in the habits of daily life. In the Laws it is maintained that the
best constitution is made up of democracy and tyranny, which are
either not constitutions at all, or are the worst of all. But they
are nearer the truth who combine many forms; for the constitution
is better which is made up of more numerous elements. The
constitution proposed in the Laws has no element of monarchy at
all; it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to
oligarchy. This is seen in the mode of appointing magistrates; for
although the appointment of them by lot from among those who have
been already selected combines both elements, the way in which the
rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly and vote for
magistrates or discharge other political duties, while the rest may
do as they like, and the endeavor to have the greater number of the
magistrates appointed out of the richer classes and the highest
officers selected from those who have the greatest incomes, both
these are oligarchical features. The oligarchical principle
prevails also in the choice of the council, for all are compelled
to choose, but the compulsion extends only to the choice out of the
first class, and of an equal number out of the second class and out
of the third class, but not in this latter case to all the voters
but to those of the first three classes; and the selection of
candidates out of the fourth class is only compulsory on the first
and second. Then, from the persons so chosen, he says that there
ought to be an equal number of each class selected. Thus a
preponderance will be given to the better sort of people, who have
the larger incomes, because many of the lower classes, not being
compelled will not vote. These considerations, and others