The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

join, but each is separate and
distinct from the rest.
    A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is
possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the
case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of
the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a
common boundary. Similarly you can find a common boundary in the
case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.
    Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time,
past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space,
likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy
a certain space, and these have a common boundary; it follows that
the parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the
solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid.
Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for
its parts have a common boundary.
    Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative
position each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a
line bear a relative position to each other, for each lies
somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish each, and to
state the position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort
of part among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly the parts of
a plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what was
the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The
same is true with regard to the solid and to space. But it would be
impossible to show that the arts of a number had a relative
position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what
parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time,
for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that
which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be better
to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being
prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, ‘one’ is
prior to ‘two’, and ‘two’ to ‘three’, and thus the parts of number
may be said to possess a relative order, though it would be
impossible to discover any distinct position for each. This holds
good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has an abiding
existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not possible
to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do not abide, they
cannot have position. Thus, some quantities consist of parts which
have position, and some of those which have not.
    Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong
to the category of quantity: everything else that is called
quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we
have in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, that
we apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of what is
white as large, because the surface over which the white extends is
large; we speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the
time covered is long; these things cannot in their own right claim
the quantitative epithet. For instance, should any one explain how
long an action was, his statement would be made in terms of the
time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, or something of
that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size of a white
object in terms of surface, for he would state the area which it
covered. Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, are in
their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the name
in its own right, but, if at all, only in a secondary sense.
    Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite
quantities this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the
contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three cubits long’, or of a
surface, or of any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that
‘much’ was the contrary of ‘little’, and ‘great’ of ‘small’. But
these are not quantitative, but relative; things are not great or
small absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act
of comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain
large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others
of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an
external standard, for if the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’ were used
absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or a grain
large. Again, we say that there are many people in a village, and
few in Athens, although those in the city are many times as
numerous as those in the