The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

the word
which come into being at the same time.
14
    There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction,
increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place.
    It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of
movement are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from
destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so
on. But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the process
necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion.
This is not true, for we may say that all affections, or nearly
all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other
sorts of motion, for that which is affected need not suffer either
increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus
alteration is a distinct sort of motion; for, if it were not, the
thing altered would not only be altered, but would forthwith
necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one of the other
sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter of fact is not the
case. Similarly that which was undergoing the process of increase
or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration
were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to
alteration also. But there are some things which undergo increase
but yet not alteration. The square, for instance, if a gnomon is
applied to it, undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is
with all other figures of this sort. Alteration and increase,
therefore, are distinct.
    Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the
different forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms;
thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of
increase, rest in a place, of change of place. As for this last,
change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly its
contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion downwards
and vice versa.
    In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those
that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its
contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should define
the contrary here also either as ‘rest in its quality’ or as
‘change in the direction of the contrary quality’, just as we
defined the contrary of change of place either as rest in a place
or as change in the reverse direction. For a thing is altered when
change of quality takes place; therefore either rest in its quality
or change in the direction of the contrary may be called the
contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way becoming
white is the contrary of becoming black; there is alteration in the
contrary direction, since a change of a qualitative nature takes
place.
15
    The term ‘to have’ is used in various senses. In the first place
it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other
quality, for we are said to ‘have’ a piece of knowledge or a
virtue. Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for
instance, in the case of a man’s height; for he is said to ‘have’ a
height of three or four cubits. It is used, moreover, with regard
to apparel, a man being said to ‘have’ a coat or tunic; or in
respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves, as a
ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a part of us,
as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the case of
a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to ‘have’
wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The expression in such cases has
reference to content. Or it refers to that which has been acquired;
we are said to ‘have’ a house or a field. A man is also said to
‘have’ a wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears to be the
most remote meaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean
simply that the husband lives with the wife.
    Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most
ordinary ones have all been enumerated.

On Interpretation
    Translated by E. M. Edghill
1
    First we must define the terms ‘noun’ and ‘verb’, then the terms
‘denial’ and ‘affirmation’, then ‘proposition’ and ‘sentence.’
    Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written
words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the
same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the
mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same
for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the
images. This matter has, however, been discussed in my