The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

syllables, the material of artificial
products, fire, &c., of bodies, the parts of the whole, and the
premisses of the conclusion, in the sense of ‘that from which’. Of
these pairs the one set are causes in the sense of substratum, e.g.
the parts, the other set in the sense of essence-the whole and the
combination and the form. But the seed and the doctor and the
adviser, and generally the maker, are all sources whence the change
or stationariness originates, while the others are causes in the
sense of the end or the good of the rest; for ‘that for the sake of
which’ means what is best and the end of the things that lead up to
it. (Whether we say the ‘good itself or the ‘apparent good’ makes
no difference.)
    Such then is the number and nature of the kinds of cause.
    Now the modes of causation are many, though when brought under
heads they too can be reduced in number. For ‘cause’ is used in
many senses and even within the same kind one may be prior to
another (e.g. the doctor and the expert are causes of health, the
relation 2:1 and number of the octave), and always what is
inclusive to what is particular. Another mode of causation is the
incidental and its genera, e.g. in one way ‘Polyclitus’, in another
‘sculptor’ is the cause of a statue, because ‘being Polyclitus’ and
‘sculptor’ are incidentally conjoined. Also the classes in which
the incidental attribute is included; thus ‘a man’ could be said to
be the cause of a statue or, generally, ‘a living creature’. An
incidental attribute too may be more or less remote, e.g. suppose
that ‘a pale man’ or ‘a musical man’ were said to be the cause of
the statue.
    All causes, both proper and incidental, may be spoken of either
as potential or as actual; e.g. the cause of a house being built is
either ‘house-builder’ or ‘house-builder building’.
    Similar distinctions can be made in the things of which the
causes are causes, e.g. of ‘this statue’ or of ‘statue’ or of
‘image’ generally, of ‘this bronze’ or of ‘bronze’ or of ‘material’
generally. So too with the incidental attributes. Again we may use
a complex expression for either and say, e.g. neither ‘Polyclitus’
nor ‘sculptor’ but ‘Polyclitus, sculptor’.
    All these various uses, however, come to six in number, under
each of which again the usage is twofold. Cause means either what
is particular or a genus, or an incidental attribute or a genus of
that, and these either as a complex or each by itself; and all six
either as actual or as potential. The difference is this much, that
causes which are actually at work and particular exist and cease to
exist simultaneously with their effect, e.g. this healing person
with this being-healed person and that house-building man with that
being-built house; but this is not always true of potential
causes—the house and the housebuilder do not pass away
simultaneously.
    In investigating the cause of each thing it is always necessary
to seek what is most precise (as also in other things): thus man
builds because he is a builder, and a builder builds in virtue of
his art of building. This last cause then is prior: and so
generally.
    Further, generic effects should be assigned to generic causes,
particular effects to particular causes, e.g. statue to sculptor,
this statue to this sculptor; and powers are relative to possible
effects, actually operating causes to things which are actually
being effected.
    This must suffice for our account of the number of causes and
the modes of causation.
<
    div id="section13" class="section" title="4">
4
    But chance also and spontaneity are reckoned among causes: many
things are said both to be and to come to be as a result of chance
and spontaneity. We must inquire therefore in what manner chance
and spontaneity are present among the causes enumerated, and
whether they are the same or different, and generally what chance
and spontaneity are.
    Some people even question whether they are real or not. They say
that nothing happens by chance, but that everything which we
ascribe to chance or spontaneity has some definite cause, e.g.
coming ‘by chance’ into the market and finding there a man whom one
wanted but did not expect to meet is due to one’s wish to go and
buy in the market. Similarly in other cases of chance it is always
possible, they maintain, to find something which is the cause; but
not chance, for if chance were real, it would seem strange