The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

which apparently and those which
really belong. The larger the supply a man has of these, the more
quickly will he reach a conclusion; and in proportion as he
apprehends those which are truer, the more cogently will he
demonstrate. But he must select not those which follow some
particular but those which follow the thing as a whole, e.g. not
what follows a particular man but what follows every man: for the
syllogism proceeds through universal premisses. If the statement is
indefinite, it is uncertain whether the premiss is universal, but
if the statement is definite, the matter is clear. Similarly one
must select those attributes which the subject follows as wholes,
for the reason given. But that which follows one must not suppose
to follow as a whole, e.g. that every animal follows man or every
science music, but only that it follows, without qualification, and
indeed we state it in a proposition: for the other statement is
useless and impossible, e.g. that every man is every animal or
justice is all good. But that which something follows receives the
mark ‘every’. Whenever the subject, for which we must obtain the
attributes that follow, is contained by something else, what
follows or does not follow the highest term universally must not be
selected in dealing with the subordinate term (for these attributes
have been taken in dealing with the superior term; for what follows
animal also follows man, and what does not belong to animal does
not belong to man); but we must choose those attributes which are
peculiar to each subject. For some things are peculiar to the
species as distinct from the genus; for species being distinct
there must be attributes peculiar to each. Nor must we take as
things which the superior term follows, those things which the
inferior term follows, e.g. take as subjects of the predicate
‘animal’ what are really subjects of the predicate ‘man’. It is
necessary indeed, if animal follows man, that it should follow all
these also. But these belong more properly to the choice of what
concerns man. One must apprehend also normal consequents and normal
antecedents-, for propositions which obtain normally are
established syllogistically from premisses which obtain normally,
some if not all of them having this character of normality. For the
conclusion of each syllogism resembles its principles. We must not
however choose attributes which are consequent upon all the terms:
for no syllogism can be made out of such premisses. The reason why
this is so will be clear in the sequel.
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    If men wish to establish something about some whole, they must
look to the subjects of that which is being established (the
subjects of which it happens to be asserted), and the attributes
which follow that of which it is to be predicated. For if any of
these subjects is the same as any of these attributes, the
attribute originally in question must belong to the subject
originally in question. But if the purpose is to establish not a
universal but a particular proposition, they must look for the
terms of which the terms in question are predicable: for if any of
these are identical, the attribute in question must belong to some
of the subject in question. Whenever the one term has to belong to
none of the other, one must look to the consequents of the subject,
and to those attributes which cannot possibly be present in the
predicate in question: or conversely to the attributes which cannot
possibly be present in the subject, and to the consequents of the
predicate. If any members of these groups are identical, one of the
terms in question cannot possibly belong to any of the other. For
sometimes a syllogism in the first figure results, sometimes a
syllogism in the second. But if the object is to establish a
particular negative proposition, we must find antecedents of the
subject in question and attributes which cannot possibly belong to
the predicate in question. If any members of these two groups are
identical, it follows that one of the terms in question does not
belong to some of the other. Perhaps each of these statements will
become clearer in the following way. Suppose the consequents of A
are designated by B, the antecedents of A by C, attributes which
cannot possibly belong to A by D. Suppose again that the attributes
of E are designated by F, the antecedents of E by G, and attributes
which cannot belong to E by H. If then one of the Cs should be
identical with one of the Fs, A must belong to all E: for F