The Rembrandt Affair

and vacuums that link the centrifuges into a cascade. In short, Martin Landesmann is supplying the Islamic Republic of Iran with everything it needs to build uranium-enrichment plants.”
    “How?” asked Adrian Carter.
    “Like this,” said Rimona.

    T HE NEXT MAP that appeared on the screen depicted the Eurasian landmass stretching from Western Europe to the Sea of Japan. Scattered across Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium was a constellation of companies, more than a dozen industrial and technological firms, including Keppler Werk GmbH of Magdeburg. All the firms were connected by dotted lines leading to the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen, headquarters of XTE Hardware and Equipment.
    “And guess who owns XTE Hardware and Equipment?” asked Rimona of no one in particular.
    “Global Vision Investments,” replied Adrian Carter.
    “Through many fronts and subsidiaries, of course,” Rimona added with a sardonic smile. “Mr. Landesmann also has a powerful partner, a Chinese private equity firm based in Shanghai that we believe is nothing more than a front company for the Ministry of State Security.”
    “The Chinese intelligence service,” murmured Steven Clark of the FBI.
    “Exactly.” Rimona walked over to the map. “Landesmann’s operation is much like the Iranian nuclear program it serves. It’s dispersed, well concealed, and it contains redundancies and backups. Best of all, Saint Martin is completely untouchable because the entire supply chain is based on dual-use technology that’s sold through cutouts. Martin is far too smart to sell the centrifuge cascades directly to the Iranians. Instead, he sells bits and pieces to XTE Hardware and Equipment. The Chinese then sell the finished product to trading companies in Dubai and Malaysia, which in turn deliver it to Iran.”
    “Can you tell how long it has been going on?” asked Cynthia Scarborough of the NSC.
    “Not precisely, but we can make an educated guess. We know that Landesmann purchased Keppler Werk in 2002 and started adding other European industrial technology firms to his secret portfolio soon after.”
    “So we’re talking about years then,” Scarborough said.
    “Several years,” replied Rimona.
    “Which means it’s possible the secret chain of enrichment facilities could be at least partially completed?”
    “That’s our assumption. And recent Iranian behavior would seem to support that position.”
    “What sort of behavior?”
    “For one thing, they’re tunneling like moles. Your own satellite photographs show the Iranians are moving more and more of their nuclear program underground. And not just at Qom. They’ve added tunnel complexes at Isfahan and Natanz, and they’re working on new ones at several other sites, including Metfaz, Khojir, and Parchin. Drilling tunnels into mountainsides isn’t easy. And it certainly isn’t cheap. We believe they’re doing it for an obvious reason—to hide plants and to protect them from attack.”
    “What else?” asked Shepard Cantwell of the CIA.
    “Natanz,” replied Rimona.
    “What about Natanz?”
    “The Iranians have moved forty-three hundred pounds of low-enriched uranium, virtually their entire stockpile, to an aboveground storage facility. It’s almost as if they’re taunting us to attack them. Why would they take such a risk?”
    “I suspect you have a theory.”
    “Iran’s economy is on life support. Its young people are so restless they’re willing to die protesting in the streets. We believe the mullahs might actually welcome an attack in order to reestablish their legitimacy with the Iranian people.”
    “But are they really willing to give up two tons of low-enriched uranium in the process?”
    “They might be if other secret facilities are spinning away. In that case, an attack on Natanz gives them an excuse to throw out the UN inspectors and renounce their participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
    “Which would then allow them to pursue a nuclear arsenal openly,” Cynthia Scarborough pointed out. “Just like the North Koreans.”
    “That’s correct, Ms. Scarborough.”
    “So what are you recommending?”
    Rimona switched off the PowerPoint. “Stopping them, of course.”

57
    THE PLAINS, VIRGINIA
    T here is a point in any such gathering when those who collect intelligence part company with those who analyze it. That moment came at the conclusion of Rimona’s briefing when Adrian Carter rose suddenly to his feet and