Consciousness and the Social Brain

or as a construct of neuronal circuits. Nothing in the data set describes the actuality. Hence, when asked, the machine (once again relying on its inner data) concludes that awareness is not mere information, not a mere construct of circuits, but is an actual presence.
    The theory is truly explanatory in the sense that it explains the observables. It explains how an information-processing machine can scan its internal data and so find, discover, conclude, decide, assign certainty that it is aware, that it is aware of this or that, that awareness has all the properties that humans normally ascribe to it. The theory explains how a brain can decide with such confidence that it has an inner experience. It explains how a brain can attribute that particular, complex, rich, idiosyncratic combination of properties to itself, to others, to pets, and even to ghosts and to gods.

Notes

Chapter 1: The Magic Trick

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Chapter 2: Introducing the Theory

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