Decision Points

been expelled from the kingdom when he opposed the government’s decision to allow American troops to be there during the Gulf War. The group held extremist views and considered it their duty to kill anyone who stood in their way.
    Al Qaeda had a penchant for high-profile attacks. Three years earlier, the terrorists had carried out simultaneous bombings of two American embassies in East Africa that killed more than two hundred and wounded more than five thousand. They were also behind the attack on the USS
Cole
that claimed the lives of seventeen American sailors off the coast of Yemen in October 2000. By the afternoon of 9/11, the intelligence community had discovered known al Qaeda operatives on the passenger manifests of the hijacked planes.
    The CIA had been worried about al Qaeda before 9/11, but theirintelligence pointed to an attack overseas. During the late spring and early summer of 2001, we had hardened security at embassies abroad, increased cooperation with foreign intelligence services, and issued warnings through the FAA about possible hijackings on international flights. In the first nine months of my presidency, we had helped disrupt terrorist threats to Paris, Rome, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other places.
    During the summer, I had asked the CIA to reexamine al Qaeda’s capabilities to attack inside the United States. In early August, the Agency delivered a Presidential Daily Briefing that reiterated bin Laden’s long-standing intent to strike America, but could not confirm any concrete plans. “We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that … bin Laden wanted to hijack a U.S. aircraft,” the PDB read. *
    On 9/11, it was obvious the intelligence community had missed something big. I was alarmed by the lapse, and I expected an explanation. But I did not think it was appropriate to point fingers or fix blame in the middle of the crisis. My immediate concern was that there could be more al Qaeda operatives in the United States.
    I looked into the video screen in the Offutt bunker and told George Tenet to get his ears up, a term for listening to all the intelligence and running down every lead.
    I also made clear that I planned to use the military in this war when the time was right. Our response would not be a pinprick cruise missile strike. As I later put it, we would do more than put “a million-dollar missile on a five-dollar tent.” When America responded to these attacks, it would be deliberate, forceful, and effective.

    There was one more issue to cover on the videoconference: when to return to Washington? Secret Service Director Brian Stafford told me the capital was still not safe. This time, I put my foot down. I had decided to speak to the nation, and there was no way I was going to do it from an underground bunker in Nebraska.
    On the flight back, Andy and CIA briefer Mike Morell came to see me in the conference room. Mike told me that the French intelligence service had provided reports of other operatives—so called sleeper cells—in the United States planning a second wave of attacks. It was a chilling phrase, “second wave.” I believed America could overcome the September 11 attacks without further panic. But a follow-on strike would be very difficult to bear. It was one of the darkest moments of the day.
    As I was watching TV coverage on the flight home, I saw a photo of Barbara Olson . Barbara was a talented TV commentator and the wife of Solicitor General Ted Olson , who argued my side in the Florida recount case before the Supreme Court. She had been aboard American Airlines Flight 77, the plane that hit the Pentagon. She was my first personal connection to the tragedy. I reached Ted on the phone. He was calm, but I could sense the shock and devastation in his voice. I told him how sorry I felt. He told me how Barbara had called him from the hijacked flight and calmly relayed information. She was a patriot to the end. I vowed to Ted that we would find those responsible for her death.
    The flight home also gave me a chance to check in with my parents. Mother and Dad had spent the night of September 10 at the White House and then left early on the morning of the eleventh. They had been in the air when news of the attacks came. The operator connected me with Dad. I could tell he was anxious. He wasn’t worried about my safety—he trusted the Secret Service to protect me—but he was concerned about the