Decision Points

out. In 1998, al Qaeda’s bombing of two American embassies in East Africa prompted President Clinton to launch cruise missiles at al Qaeda sites in Afghanistan. But the training camps had been largely abandoned, and the long-distance strike came across as impotent and ineffectual. When al Qaeda blew up the USS
Cole
off the coast of Yemen, America mounted almost no response at all.
    My predecessors made their decisions in a different era. After al Qaeda killed nearly three thousand people in the United States, it was clear the terrorists had interpreted our lack of a serious response as a sign of weakness and an invitation to attempt more brazen attacks. Al Qaeda messages frequently cited our withdrawals as evidence that Americans were, in the words of bin Laden, “paper tigers” who could be forced to “run in less than twenty-four hours.”
    After 9/11, I was determined to change that impression. I decided to employ the most aggressive of the three options General Shelton had laid out. Cruise missile and manned bomber attacks would be part of our response, but they were not enough. Dropping expensive weapons on sparsely populated camps would not break the Taliban’s hold on the country or destroy al Qaeda’s sanctuary. It would only reinforce the terrorists’ belief that they could strike us without paying a serious price. This time we would put boots on the ground, and keep them there until the Taliban and al Qaeda were driven out and a free society could emerge.
    Unless I received definitive evidence tying Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 plot, I would work to resolve the Iraq problem diplomatically. I hoped unified pressure by the world might compel Saddam to meet his international obligations. The best way to show him we were serious was to succeed in Afghanistan.
    The next morning, I convened the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room. “The purpose of this meeting is to assign tasks for the first wave of the war on terrorism,” I said. “It starts today.”

    Shortly after 9/11, Denny Hastert, the reliable and steady speaker of the House, had suggested that I address a joint session of Congress, asPresident Franklin Roosevelt had done after Pearl Harbor. I liked the idea but wanted to wait until I had something to say. Now I did. We scheduled the speech for September 20.
    I knew the American people had a lot of questions: Who attacked us? Why do they hate us? What will the war look like? What is expected of the average citizen? The answers would form the outline of my address.
    I decided to invite a special guest to join me for the speech, British Prime Minister Tony Blair . A few hours before I left for Capitol Hill, Tony came to the White House for dinner. I pulled him into a quiet corner of the State Floor to give him an update on the war plans, including my decision to deploy ground troops. He reiterated that Great Britain would be at our side. America’s closest ally in the wars of the last century would be with us in the first war of a new century.
    As the moment to deliver the speech approached, Tony said, “You don’t seem the least bit nervous, George. Don’t you need some time alone?” I hadn’t thought about it until he mentioned it. I didn’t need to be alone. I had taken time to make a careful decision, and I knew what I wanted to say. Plus, I appreciated the company of my friend.

    In the Blue Room with Tony Blair.
White House/Eric Draper
    The environment in the House chamber felt different from the National Cathedral on September 14. There was a mix of energy, anger, and defiance. I later learned that more than eighty-two million people were watching on TV, the largest audience ever for a presidential speech.
    “In the normal course of events, presidents come to this chamber to report on the state of the Union,” I began. “Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been delivered by the American people. … My fellow citizens, we have seen the state of our Union—and it is strong.”
    I ran through the questions and answers—the identity of the terrorists, their ideology, and the new kind of war we would wage. “Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes,” I said. “Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. … Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.