No Easy Day: The Firsthand Account of the Mission That Killed Osama Bin Laden

do was find an alternate way to approach the target. No one wanted to fly to the X. We’d given up doing that years ago. We were more comfortable being dropped off and patrolling to the compound. Our tactics had evolved over the years into being as sneaky as we could so we could keep the element of surprise until the very last second.
    The reconnaissance and sniper teams studied satellite images, trying to find landing zones within four to six kilometers of the target, but none of the routes seemed to work. The compound was in a residential area. All of the landing zones were either too close to urban areas or we’d have to walk down city streets. The risks of getting compromised during our infil were too high. In the end, flying to the X was the lesser of two evils. It would be loud, but it would be fast. We couldn’t risk being compromised during the foot patrol.
    Huddled in separate corners of the operations center, the teams got together individually to plan their part. Beyond our personal gear, we started to divide up our team gear list—a ladder, a sledgehammer, and explosives.
    “I’ll need the ladder to climb the carport,” the sniper said. The collapsible ladder was heavy and burdensome. “Mike said he’d carry it on his back during the fast-rope so I can provide better security.”
    We positioned two snipers, one in each door of Chalk One, to cover us as we roped into the compound. We didn’t need someone walking into the compound with an AK-47 and shooting us as we slid down the rope.
    “Since Will isn’t here to argue, he gets the sledge,” I said with a smirk. “I’ll carry two breaching charges and a set of bolt cutters.”
    A breaching charge was a two-inch-thick strip of explosives. The charge was about twelve inches long with a strip of adhesive that ran along its spine so we could stick it to the door. Once initiated, it would explode in about three seconds and usually tear a door open by cutting through the locking mechanism.
    The goal of each team was to be self-sufficient. The last thing anybody wanted was to have to call another team over to help because they didn’t have the right equipment.
    A woman from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, a blonde in her early thirties, took care of the maps and satellite images for us. She provided any detail—big or small.
    Kneeling down to look at the mock-up, I studied the door leading into the guesthouse.
    “Hey, are these doors on C1 inward or outward opening?” I asked her.
    She was back in a few minutes with the answer.
    “Double metal door,” she said. “Opens outwards.”
    It was like that all week. If we had a question, they had the answer, including where the Pacer walked, who else lived on the compound, which gates were locked or unlocked, and even where they frequently parked their cars. They had a huge number of images from drones and satellites, and there wasn’t much they didn’t know about the outside environment of the compound.

    In Washington, President Obama and his advisors were still discussing different options. The president still had not signed off on the ground-assault option. All we had been authorized to do up to now was to start planning and conduct rehearsals. The White House was still considering an Air Force option, a massive air strike using B-2 Spirit bombers to level the house.
    Defense Secretary Robert Gates supported the air strike because it kept American ground forces out of Pakistan, which made the mission less like an invasion of the country’s sovereignty.
    The United States didn’t have a great track record when it came to commando raids like the one we were planning. Since Operation Eagle Claw, there was a lot of risk in putting troops in harm’s way in a sovereign country.
    During Eagle Claw, one of six helicopters flying to a desert staging base in Iran before the raid hit a fierce sand cloud and crashed into an MC-130E containing fuel. The fire destroyed both aircraft and killed eight servicemen. The mission, one of the first operations conducted by Delta Force, was aborted. Eagle Claw was a disaster and contributed to Carter losing his reelection campaign.
    The air-strike option required thirty-two two-thousand-pound smart bombs. The barrage would last for a full minute and a half and the crater would penetrate at least thirty feet into the earth in case the compound had a bunker system. The possibility for collateral damage was high, and the possibility of finding