No Easy Day: The Firsthand Account of the Mission That Killed Osama Bin Laden

received had him hiding in Pakistan.

    Soon , my teammates started to come in from breakfast. I was still studying the model when Tom walked into the room. He was one of the team leaders on Chalk One, and his team was responsible for clearing the first floor of the main building, called A1.
    “They call him the Pacer because he walks for hours. They keep seeing the Pacer there,” Tom said as he pointed to a courtyard on the east side of the compound. “According to what the intel folks are saying, he walks out in the garden area to exercise from time to time. They think the Pacer is UBL.”
    Walt and Charlie came in next. They both had big grins on their faces.
    “You called it,” I said to Charlie. “How did they find him?”
    “One of his couriers,” Charlie said. “He has two guys working for him.”
    The day before, the CIA had briefed my teammates on the “Road to Abbottabad,” essentially how they found Bin Laden. In the operations center, there were several booklets full of intelligence about the area and Bin Laden. While we waited for the others to arrive from breakfast, I started to read the briefings. I was a day behind and wanted to get up to speed before the serious planning started.
    Public sources later confirmed that the target compound, worth close to $1 million, was built in 2005, close to Pakistan’s military academy. It was much larger than other houses in the area and didn’t have a telephone or an Internet connection. The walls were built higher on the southern side of the compound to prevent people seeing inside the courtyard. Those walls blocked the view of the second and third floors. The windows on both the second and third floors of the main building were blacked out so no one could see in or out.
    There was no evidence the Pacer had any contact outside of the compound. The residents burned their trash and had very little contact with their neighbors.
    One of the people known to live at the compound was Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.
    The CIA learned of Ahmed al-Kuwaiti after the interrogation of a man named Mohammed al-Qahtani, a Saudi citizen and the alleged twentieth hijacker on September 11, 2001. Immigration agents barred him from entering the United States in August 2001 because they thought he was trying to immigrate illegally to the United States. Investigators found out later that Mohammed Atta, one of the leaders of the plot, was waiting for him at the Orlando airport that day.
    Al-Qahtani was sent back to Dubai only to get captured in the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001 and sent to the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When his fingerprints came back as the same man sent back by immigration, interrogators went to work over several months in 2002 and 2003.
    Al-Qahtani eventually told them that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the planner of the September 11 attacks, sent him to the United States. He also admitted to meeting Bin Laden and receiving terrorist training, and identified a man named Ahmed al-Kuwaiti as one of Bin Laden’s couriers and right-hand men. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was by this time in American custody as well, also acknowledged he knew al-Kuwaiti, but stressed that the courier was not part of al Qaeda.
    Then in 2004, Hassan Ghul was captured. Ghul was a courier and al Qaeda agent. He told intelligence officials al-Kuwaiti was close to Bin Laden. When interrogators questioned Khalid Sheikh Mohammed about it again, he downplayed al-Kuwaiti’s role. Mohammed’s successor, Abu Faraj al-Libi, captured by the Pakistanis in 2005, told interrogators he hadn’t seen al-Kuwaiti in a while. Since both Mohammed and al-Libi dismissed al-Kuwaiti’s role when asked about him, intelligence analysts began to believe he might be with Bin Laden.
    The CIA knew that al-Kuwaiti and his brother, thirty-three-year-old Abrar Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, had worked for Bin Laden in the past. The agency started to track Ahmed al-Kuwaiti in Pakistan, hoping he would lead them to his brother and then to Bin Laden.
    Then, during an intercepted call to his family in 2010, one of his family members asked him what he was doing for work. For the most part, al-Kuwaiti had been savvy and kept his employer secret. So, when the family member asked what he was doing for work, al-Kuwaiti said he was “doing what he used to do.”
    That subtle answer connected some dots and provided a good starting point for this operation. It was all circumstantial evidence, but it was all we had to go on.
    The CIA started