The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

nothing pleasant and nothing more attractive
than anything else, he must be something quite different from a
man; this sort of person has not received a name because he hardly
occurs. The temperate man occupies a middle position with regard to
these objects. For he neither enjoys the things that the
self-indulgent man enjoys most-but rather dislikes them-nor in
general the things that he should not, nor anything of this sort to
excess, nor does he feel pain or craving when they are absent, or
does so only to a moderate degree, and not more than he should, nor
when he should not, and so on; but the things that, being pleasant,
make for health or for good condition, he will desire moderately
and as he should, and also other pleasant things if they are not
hindrances to these ends, or contrary to what is noble, or beyond
his means. For he who neglects these conditions loves such
pleasures more than they are worth, but the temperate man is not
that sort of person, but the sort of person that the right rule
prescribes.
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    Self-indulgence is more like a voluntary state than cowardice.
For the former is actuated by pleasure, the latter by pain, of
which the one is to be chosen and the other to be avoided; and pain
upsets and destroys the nature of the person who feels it, while
pleasure does nothing of the sort. Therefore self-indulgence is
more voluntary. Hence also it is more a matter of reproach; for it
is easier to become accustomed to its objects, since there are many
things of this sort in life, and the process of habituation to them
is free from danger, while with terrible objects the reverse is the
case. But cowardice would seem to be voluntary in a different
degree from its particular manifestations; for it is itself
painless, but in these we are upset by pain, so that we even throw
down our arms and disgrace ourselves in other ways; hence our acts
are even thought to be done under compulsion. For the
self-indulgent man, on the other hand, the particular acts are
voluntary (for he does them with craving and desire), but the whole
state is less so; for no one craves to be self-indulgent.
    The name self-indulgence is applied also to childish faults; for
they bear a certain resemblance to what we have been considering.
Which is called after which, makes no difference to our present
purpose; plainly, however, the later is called after the earlier.
The transference of the name seems not a bad one; for that which
desires what is base and which develops quickly ought to be kept in
a chastened condition, and these characteristics belong above all
to appetite and to the child, since children in fact live at the
beck and call of appetite, and it is in them that the desire for
what is pleasant is strongest. If, then, it is not going to be
obedient and subject to the ruling principle, it will go to great
lengths; for in an irrational being the desire for pleasure is
insatiable even if it tries every source of gratification, and the
exercise of appetite increases its innate force, and if appetites
are strong and violent they even expel the power of calculation.
Hence they should be moderate and few, and should in no way oppose
the rational principle-and this is what we call an obedient and
chastened state-and as the child should live according to the
direction of his tutor, so the appetitive element should live
according to rational principle. Hence the appetitive element in a
temperate man should harmonize with the rational principle; for the
noble is the mark at which both aim, and the temperate man craves
for the things be ought, as he ought, as when he ought; and when he
ought; and this is what rational principle directs.
    Here we conclude our account of temperance.

Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV
    Translated by W. D. Ross
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    Let us speak next of liberality. It seems to be the mean with
regard to wealth; for the liberal man is praised not in respect of
military matters, nor of those in respect of which the temrate man
is praised, nor of judicial decisions, but with regard to the
giving and taking of wealth, and especially in respect of giving.
Now by ‘wealth’ we mean all the things whose value is measured by
money. Further, prodigality and meanness are excesses and defects
with regard to wealth; and meanness we always impute to those who
care more than they ought for wealth, but we sometimes apply the
word ‘prodigality’ in a complex sense; for we