The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

say
‘incontinent in respect of honour, or of gain’.
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5
    (1) Some things are pleasant by nature, and of these (a) some
are so without qualification, and (b) others are so with reference
to particular classes either of animals or of men; while (2) others
are not pleasant by nature, but (a) some of them become so by
reason of injuries to the system, and (b) others by reason of
acquired habits, and (c) others by reason of originally bad
natures. This being so, it is possible with regard to each of the
latter kinds to discover similar states of character to those
recognized with regard to the former; I mean (A) the brutish
states, as in the case of the female who, they say, rips open
pregnant women and devours the infants, or of the things in which
some of the tribes about the Black Sea that have gone savage are
said to delight-in raw meat or in human flesh, or in lending their
children to one another to feast upon-or of the story told of
Phalaris.
    These states are brutish, but (B) others arise as a result of
disease (or, in some cases, of madness, as with the man who
sacrificed and ate his mother, or with the slave who ate the liver
of his fellow), and others are morbid states (C) resulting from
custom, e.g. the habit of plucking out the hair or of gnawing the
nails, or even coals or earth, and in addition to these paederasty;
for these arise in some by nature and in others, as in those who
have been the victims of lust from childhood, from habit.
    Now those in whom nature is the cause of such a state no one
would call incontinent, any more than one would apply the epithet
to women because of the passive part they play in copulation; nor
would one apply it to those who are in a morbid condition as a
result of habit. To have these various types of habit is beyond the
limits of vice, as brutishness is too; for a man who has them to
master or be mastered by them is not simple (continence or)
incontinence but that which is so by analogy, as the man who is in
this condition in respect of fits of anger is to be called
incontinent in respect of that feeling but not incontinent simply.
For every excessive state whether of folly, of cowardice, of
self-indulgence, or of bad temper, is either brutish or morbid; the
man who is by nature apt to fear everything, even the squeak of a
mouse, is cowardly with a brutish cowardice, while the man who
feared a weasel did so in consequence of disease; and of foolish
people those who by nature are thoughtless and live by their senses
alone are brutish, like some races of the distant barbarians, while
those who are so as a result of disease (e.g. of epilepsy) or of
madness are morbid. Of these characteristics it is possible to have
some only at times, and not to be mastered by them. e.g. Phalaris
may have restrained a desire to eat the flesh of a child or an
appetite for unnatural sexual pleasure; but it is also possible to
be mastered, not merely to have the feelings. Thus, as the
wickedness which is on the human level is called wickedness simply,
while that which is not is called wickedness not simply but with
the qualification ‘brutish’ or ‘morbid’, in the same way it is
plain that some incontinence is brutish and some morbid, while only
that which corresponds to human self-indulgence is incontinence
simply.
    That incontinence and continence, then, are concerned only with
the same objects as selfindulgence and temperance and that what is
concerned with other objects is a type distinct from incontinence,
and called incontinence by a metaphor and not simply, is plain.
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6
    That incontinence in respect of anger is less disgraceful than
that in respect of the appetites is what we will now proceed to
see. (1) Anger seems to listen to argument to some extent, but to
mishear it, as do hasty servants who run out before they have heard
the whole of what one says, and then muddle the order, or as dogs
bark if there is but a knock at the door, before looking to see if
it is a friend; so anger by reason of the warmth and hastiness of
its nature, though it hears, does not hear an order, and springs to
take revenge. For argument or imagination informs us that we have
been insulted or slighted, and anger, reasoning as it were that
anything like this must be fought against, boils up straightway;
while appetite, if argument or perception merely says that an
object is pleasant, springs to the enjoyment of it. Therefore anger
obeys