The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

be; but
because the other extreme is seen in few people and seldom, as
temperance is thought to be contrary only to self-indulgence, so is
continence to incontinence.
    Since many names are applied analogically, it is by analogy that
we have come to speak of the ‘continence’ the temperate man; for
both the continent man and the temperate man are such as to do
nothing contrary to the rule for the sake of the bodily pleasures,
but the former has and the latter has not bad appetites, and the
latter is such as not to feel pleasure contrary to the rule, while
the former is such as to feel pleasure but not to be led by it. And
the incontinent and the self-indulgent man are also like another;
they are different, but both pursue bodily pleasures—the latter,
however, also thinking that he ought to do so, while the former
does not think this.
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    Nor can the same man have practical wisdom and be incontinent;
for it has been shown’ that a man is at the same time practically
wise, and good in respect of character. Further, a man has
practical wisdom not by knowing only but by being able to act; but
the incontinent man is unable to act-there is, however, nothing to
prevent a clever man from being incontinent; this is why it is
sometimes actually thought that some people have practical wisdom
but are incontinent, viz. because cleverness and practical wisdom
differ in the way we have described in our first discussions, and
are near together in respect of their reasoning, but differ in
respect of their purpose-nor yet is the incontinent man like the
man who knows and is contemplating a truth, but like the man who is
asleep or drunk. And he acts willingly (for he acts in a sense with
knowledge both of what he does and of the end to which he does it),
but is not wicked, since his purpose is good; so that he is
half-wicked. And he is not a criminal; for he does not act of
malice aforethought; of the two types of incontinent man the one
does not abide by the conclusions of his deliberation, while the
excitable man does not deliberate at all. And thus the incontinent
man like a city which passes all the right decrees and has good
laws, but makes no use of them, as in Anaxandrides’ jesting
remark,
The city willed it, that cares nought for laws;
    but the wicked man is like a city that uses its laws, but has
wicked laws to use.
    Now incontinence and continence are concerned with that which is
in excess of the state characteristic of most men; for the
continent man abides by his resolutions more and the incontinent
man less than most men can.
    Of the forms of incontinence, that of excitable people is more
curable than that of those who deliberate but do not abide by their
decisions, and those who are incontinent through habituation are
more curable than those in whom incontinence is innate; for it is
easier to change a habit than to change one’s nature; even habit is
hard to change just because it is like nature, as Evenus says:
I say that habit’s but a long practice, friend,
And this becomes men’s nature in the end.
    We have now stated what continence, incontinence, endurance, and
softness are, and how these states are related to each other.
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    The study of pleasure and pain belongs to the province of the
political philosopher; for he is the architect of the end, with a
view to which we call one thing bad and another good without
qualification. Further, it is one of our necessary tasks to
consider them; for not only did we lay it down that moral virtue
and vice are concerned with pains and pleasures, but most people
say that happiness involves pleasure; this is why the blessed man
is called by a name derived from a word meaning enjoyment.
    Now (1) some people think that no pleasure is a good, either in
itself or incidentally, since the good and pleasure are not the
same; (2) others think that some pleasures are good but that most
are bad. (3) Again there is a third view, that even if all
pleasures are good, yet the best thing in the world cannot be
pleasure. (1) The reasons given for the view that pleasure is not a
good at all are (a) that every pleasure is a perceptible process to
a natural state, and that no process is of the same kind as its
end, e.g. no process of building of the same kind as a house. (b) A
temperate man avoids pleasures. (c) A man of practical wisdom
pursues what is free from pain, not what is pleasant. (d) The
pleasures are a