The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

dominating power
are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of
such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is
exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends? Or
how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The
greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and
in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It
helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by
ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that
are failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it stimulates
to noble actions-’two going together’-for with friends men are more
able both to think and to act. Again, parent seems by nature to
feel it for offspring and offspring for parent, not only among men
but among birds and among most animals; it is felt mutually by
members of the same race, and especially by men, whence we praise
lovers of their fellowmen. We may even in our travels how near and
dear every man is to every other. Friendship seems too to hold
states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for
justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and
this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst
enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while
when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest
form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.
    But it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those
who love their friends, and it is thought to be a fine thing to
have many friends; and again we think it is the same people that
are good men and are friends.
    Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some
define it as a kind of likeness and say like people are friends,
whence come the sayings ‘like to like’, ‘birds of a feather flock
together’, and so on; others on the contrary say ‘two of a trade
never agree’. On this very question they inquire for deeper and
more physical causes, Euripides saying that ‘parched earth loves
the rain, and stately heaven when filled with rain loves to fall to
earth’, and Heraclitus that ‘it is what opposes that helps’ and
‘from different tones comes the fairest tune’ and ‘all things are
produced through strife’; while Empedocles, as well as others,
expresses the opposite view that like aims at like. The physical
problems we may leave alone (for they do not belong to the present
inquiry); let us examine those which are human and involve
character and feeling, e.g. whether friendship can arise between
any two people or people cannot be friends if they are wicked, and
whether there is one species of friendship or more than one. Those
who think there is only one because it admits of degrees have
relied on an inadequate indication; for even things different in
species admit of degree. We have discussed this matter
previously.
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2
    The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first
come to know the object of love. For not everything seems to be
loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful;
but it would seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is
produced that is useful, so that it is the good and the useful that
are lovable as ends. Do men love, then, the good, or what is good
for them? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the
pleasant. Now it is thought that each loves what is good for
himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and
what is good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves
not what is good for him but what seems good. This however will
make no difference; we shall just have to say that this is ‘that
which seems lovable’. Now there are three grounds on which people
love; of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word
‘friendship’; for it is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of
good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine
well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so
that one may have it oneself); but to a friend we say we ought to
wish what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish good we
ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill
when it is reciprocal being friendship. Or must we add ‘when it is
recognized’? For many people have goodwill to those whom they have
not seen but judge to be good or useful; and one of these might
return this feeling. These people