The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

whether
slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And,
whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if
they have virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the
other hand, since they are men and share in rational principle, it
seems absurd to say that they have no virtue. A similar question
may be raised about women and children, whether they too have
virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and is a
child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or note So in
general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural
subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For if a
noble nature is equally required in both, why should one of them
always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that
this is a question of degree, for the difference between ruler and
subject is a difference of kind, which the difference of more and
less never is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the one
ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the
ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well? If the
subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious and cowardly, he
will certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore, that both
of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural
subjects also vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of
the soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and
the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain to
be different from that of the subject; the one being the virtue of
the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is
obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore
almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the
kind of rule differs; the freeman rules over the slave after
another manner from that in which the male rules over the female,
or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are
present in an of them, they are present in different degrees. For
the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it
is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature. So it
must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all
should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is
required by each for the fulfillment of his duty. Hence the ruler
ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function, taken
absolutely, demands a master artificer, and rational principle is
such an artificer; the subjects, oil the other hand, require only
that measure of virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly,
then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a
man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a
woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a
man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds
of all other virtues, as will be more clearly seen if we look at
them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists in
a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like,
only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions is their
mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues. All
classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the
poet says of women,
Silence is a woman’s glory,
    but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is
imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to
himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in
like manner the virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we
determined that a slave is useful for the wants of life, and
therefore he will obviously require only so much virtue as will
prevent him from failing in his duty through cowardice or lack of
self-control. Some one will ask whether, if what we are saying is
true, virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they
often fail in their work through the lack of self control? But is
there not a great difference in the two cases? For the slave shares
in his master’s life; the artisan is less closely connected with
him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a
slave. The meaner sort of mechanic has a special and separate
slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the
shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest, then, that the master
ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a
mere possessor of the art of mastership which trains the slave in
his duties. Wherefore