The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

able to
maintain 1500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, the whole number of
Spartan citizens fell below 1000. The result proves the faulty
nature of their laws respecting property; for the city sank under a
single defeat; the want of men was their ruin. There is a tradition
that, in the days of their ancient kings, they were in the habit of
giving the rights of citizenship to strangers, and therefore, in
spite of their long wars, no lack of population was experienced by
them; indeed, at one time Sparta is said to have numbered not less
than 10,000 citizens Whether this statement is true or not, it
would certainly have been better to have maintained their numbers
by the equalization of property. Again, the law which relates to
the procreation of children is adverse to the correction of this
inequality. For the legislator, wanting to have as many Spartans as
he could, encouraged the citizens to have large families; and there
is a law at Sparta that the father of three sons shall be exempt
from military service, and he who has four from all the burdens of
the state. Yet it is obvious that, if there were many children, the
land being distributed as it is, many of them must necessarily fall
into poverty.
    The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another point; I
mean the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority in the highest
matters, but the Ephors are chosen from the whole people, and so
the office is apt to fall into the hands of very poor men, who,
being badly off, are open to bribes. There have been many examples
at Sparta of this evil in former times; and quite recently, in the
matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were bribed did
their best to ruin the state. And so great and tyrannical is their
power, that even the kings have been compelled to court them, so
that, in this way as well together with the royal office, the whole
constitution has deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy has
turned into a democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does keep the
state together; for the people are contented when they have a share
in the highest office, and the result, whether due to the
legislator or to chance, has been advantageous. For if a
constitution is to be permanent, all the parts of the state must
wish that it should exist and the same arrangements be maintained.
This is the case at Sparta, where the kings desire its permanence
because they have due honor in their own persons; the nobles
because they are represented in the council of elders (for the
office of elder is a reward of virtue); and the people, because all
are eligible to the Ephoralty. The election of Ephors out of the
whole people is perfectly right, but ought not to be carried on in
the present fashion, which is too childish. Again, they have the
decision of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men, and
therefore they should not determine them merely on their own
judgment, but according to written rules, and to the laws. Their
way of life, too, is not in accordance with the spirit of the
constitution—they have a deal too much license; whereas, in the
case of the other citizens, the excess of strictness is so
intolerable that they run away from the law into the secret
indulgence of sensual pleasures.
    Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. It may be
said that the elders are good men and well trained in manly virtue;
and that, therefore, there is an advantage to the state in having
them. But that judges of important causes should hold office for
life is a disputable thing, for the mind grows old as well as the
body. And when men have been educated in such a manner that even
the legislator himself cannot trust them, there is real danger.
Many of the elders are well known to have taken bribes and to have
been guilty of partiality in public affairs. And therefore they
ought not to be irresponsible; yet at Sparta they are so. But (it
may be replied), ‘All magistracies are accountable to the Ephors.’
Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them, and we maintain
that the control should be exercised in some other manner. Further,
the mode in which the Spartans elect their elders is childish; and
it is improper that the person to be elected should canvass for the
office; the worthiest should be appointed, whether he chooses or
not. And here the legislator clearly indicates the same intention
which appears in other parts of his constitution; he would have his
citizens ambitious, and he has reckoned upon this quality in