The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

an oligarchy or a
tyranny to a democracy. In such cases persons refuse to fulfill
their contracts or any other obligations, on the ground that the
tyrant, and not the state, contracted them; they argue that some
constitutions are established by force, and not for the sake of the
common good. But this would apply equally to democracies, for they
too may be founded on violence, and then the acts of the democracy
will be neither more nor less acts of the state in question than
those of an oligarchy or of a tyranny. This question runs up into
another: on what principle shall we ever say that the state is the
same, or different? It would be a very superficial view which
considered only the place and the inhabitants (for the soil and the
population may be separated, and some of the inhabitants may live
in one place and some in another). This, however, is not a very
serious difficulty; we need only remark that the word ‘state’ is
ambiguous.
    It is further asked: When are men, living in the same place, to
be regarded as a single city—what is the limit? Certainly not the
wall of the city, for you might surround all Peloponnesus with a
wall. Like this, we may say, is Babylon, and every city that has
the compass of a nation rather than a city; Babylon, they say, had
been taken for three days before some part of the inhabitants
became aware of the fact. This difficulty may, however, with
advantage be deferred to another occasion; the statesman has to
consider the size of the state, and whether it should consist of
more than one nation or not.
    Again, shall we say that while the race of inhabitants, as well
as their place of abode, remain the same, the city is also the
same, although the citizens are always dying and being born, as we
call rivers and fountains the same, although the water is always
flowing away and coming again Or shall we say that the generations
of men, like the rivers, are the same, but that the state changes?
For, since the state is a partnership, and is a partnership of
citizens in a constitution, when the form of government changes,
and becomes different, then it may be supposed that the state is no
longer the same, just as a tragic differs from a comic chorus,
although the members of both may be identical. And in this manner
we speak of every union or composition of elements as different
when the form of their composition alters; for example, a scale
containing the same sounds is said to be different, accordingly as
the Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed. And if this is true it
is evident that the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the
sameness of the constitution, and it may be called or not called by
the same name, whether the inhabitants are the same or entirely
different. It is quite another question, whether a state ought or
ought not to fulfill engagements when the form of government
changes.
IV
    There is a point nearly allied to the preceding: Whether the
virtue of a good man and a good citizen is the same or not. But,
before entering on this discussion, we must certainly first obtain
some general notion of the virtue of the citizen. Like the sailor,
the citizen is a member of a community. Now, sailors have different
functions, for one of them is a rower, another a pilot, and a third
a look-out man, a fourth is described by some similar term; and
while the precise definition of each individual’s virtue applies
exclusively to him, there is, at the same time, a common definition
applicable to them all. For they have all of them a common object,
which is safety in navigation. Similarly, one citizen differs from
another, but the salvation of the community is the common business
of them all. This community is the constitution; the virtue of the
citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he
is a member. If, then, there are many forms of government, it is
evident that there is not one single virtue of the good citizen
which is perfect virtue. But we say that the good man is he who has
one single virtue which is perfect virtue. Hence it is evident that
the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue which
makes a good man.
    The same question may also be approached by another road, from a
consideration of the best constitution. If the state cannot be
entirely composed of good men, and yet each citizen is expected to
do his own business well, and must therefore have virtue, still
inasmuch as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the
citizen and of