The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

a man would be thought a coward if he had no more
courage than a courageous woman, and a woman would be thought
loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation
than the good man; and indeed their part in the management of the
household is different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and
of the other to preserve. Practical wisdom only is characteristic
of the ruler: it would seem that all other virtues must equally
belong to ruler and subject. The virtue of the subject is certainly
not wisdom, but only true opinion; he may be compared to the maker
of the flute, while his master is like the flute-player or user of
the flute.
    From these considerations may be gathered the answer to the
question, whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of
the good citizen, or different, and how far the same, and how far
different.
V
    There still remains one more question about the citizen: Is he
only a true citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic
to be included? If they who hold no office are to be deemed
citizens, not every citizen can have this virtue of ruling and
obeying; for this man is a citizen And if none of the lower class
are citizens, in which part of the state are they to be placed? For
they are not resident aliens, and they are not foreigners. May we
not reply, that as far as this objection goes there is no more
absurdity in excluding them than in excluding slaves and freedmen
from any of the above-mentioned classes? It must be admitted that
we cannot consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to
the existence of the state; for example, children are not citizen
equally with grown-up men, who are citizens absolutely, but
children, not being grown up, are only citizens on a certain
assumption. Nay, in ancient times, and among some nations the
artisan class were slaves or foreigners, and therefore the majority
of them are so now. The best form of state will not admit them to
citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the
virtue of a citizen will not apply to every citizen nor to every
free man as such, but only to those who are freed from necessary
services. The necessary people are either slaves who minister to
the wants of individuals, or mechanics and laborers who are the
servants of the community. These reflections carried a little
further will explain their position; and indeed what has been said
already is of itself, when understood, explanation enough.
    Since there are many forms of government there must be many
varieties of citizen and especially of citizens who are subjects;
so that under some governments the mechanic and the laborer will be
citizens, but not in others, as, for example, in aristocracy or the
so-called government of the best (if there be such an one), in
which honors are given according to virtue and merit; for no man
can practice virtue who is living the life of a mechanic or
laborer. In oligarchies the qualification for office is high, and
therefore no laborer can ever be a citizen; but a mechanic may, for
an actual majority of them are rich. At Thebes there was a law that
no man could hold office who had not retired from business for ten
years. But in many states the law goes to the length of admitting
aliens; for in some democracies a man is a citizen though his
mother only be a citizen; and a similar principle is applied to
illegitimate children; the law is relaxed when there is a dearth of
population. But when the number of citizens increases, first the
children of a male or a female slave are excluded; then those whose
mothers only are citizens; and at last the right of citizenship is
confined to those whose fathers and mothers are both citizens.
    Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of citizens; and
he is a citizen in the highest sense who shares in the honors of
the state. Compare Homer’s words, ‘like some dishonored stranger’;
he who is excluded from the honors of the state is no better than
an alien. But when his exclusion is concealed, then the object is
that the privileged class may deceive their fellow inhabitants.
    As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the
same as that of the good citizen, the considerations already
adduced prove that in some states the good man and the good citizen
are the same, and in others different. When they are the same it is
not every citizen who is a good man, but only the statesman and
those who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with