The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

attempts what is impossible, and they will not attempt to
overthrow a tyranny, if they are powerless. Under these three heads
the whole policy of a tyrant may be summed up, and to one or other
of them all his ideas may be referred: (1) he sows distrust among
his subjects; (2) he takes away their power; (3) he humbles
them.
    This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies are
preserved; and there is another which proceeds upon an almost
opposite principle of action. The nature of this latter method may
be gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroy kingdoms,
for as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of
king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make it
more like the rule of a king. But of one thing the tyrant must be
careful; he must keep power enough to rule over his subjects,
whether they like him or not, for if he once gives this up he gives
up his tyranny. But though power must be retained as the
foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or appear to act in
the character of a king. In the first place he should pretend a
care of the public revenues, and not waste money in making presents
of a sort at which the common people get excited when they see
their hard-won earnings snatched from them and lavished on
courtesans and strangers and artists. He should give an account of
what he receives and of what he spends (a practice which has been
adopted by some tyrants); for then he will seem to be a steward of
the public rather than a tyrant; nor need he fear that, while he is
the lord of the city, he will ever be in want of money. Such a
policy is at all events much more advantageous for the tyrant when
he goes from home, than to leave behind him a hoard, for then the
garrison who remain in the city will be less likely to attack his
power; and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has more reason
to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens, for the
one accompany him, but the others remain behind. In the second
place, he should be seen to collect taxes and to require public
services only for state purposes, and that he may form a fund in
case of war, and generally he ought to make himself the guardian
and treasurer of them, as if they belonged, not to him, but to the
public. He should appear, not harsh, but dignified, and when men
meet him they should look upon him with reverence, and not with
fear. Yet it is hard for him to be respected if he inspires no
respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may neglect, at least he
should maintain the character of a great soldier, and produce the
impression that he is one. Neither he nor any of his associates
should ever be guilty of the least offense against modesty towards
the young of either sex who are his subjects, and the women of his
family should observe a like self-control towards other women; the
insolence of women has ruined many tyrannies. In the indulgence of
pleasures he should be the opposite of our modern tyrants, who not
only begin at dawn and pass whole days in sensuality, but want
other men to see them, that they may admire their happy and blessed
lot. In these things a tyrant should if possible be moderate, or at
any rate should not parade his vices to the world; for a drunken
and drowsy tyrant is soon despised and attacked; not so he who is
temperate and wide awake. His conduct should be the very reverse of
nearly everything which has been said before about tyrants. He
ought to adorn and improve his city, as though he were not a
tyrant, but the guardian of the state. Also he should appear to be
particularly earnest in the service of the Gods; for if men think
that a ruler is religious and has a reverence for the Gods, they
are less afraid of suffering injustice at his hands, and they are
less disposed to conspire against him, because they believe him to
have the very Gods fighting on his side. At the same time his
religion must not be thought foolish. And he should honor men of
merit, and make them think that they would not be held in more
honor by the citizens if they had a free government. The honor he
should distribute himself, but the punishment should be inflicted
by officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which is taken by
all monarchs not to make one person great; but if one, then two or
more should be raised, that they may look sharply after one
another. If after all some one has to be made great, he should not
be a man of bold spirit; for such dispositions are ever