The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

democracy the citizens
are very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless they
are paid, and to pay them when there are no revenues presses hardly
upon the notables (for the money must be obtained by a property tax
and confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which
have before now overthrown many democracies); where, I say, there
are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the
law-courts should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days
only. This system has two advantages: first, the rich do not fear
the expense, even although they are unpaid themselves when the poor
are paid; and secondly, causes are better tried, for wealthy
persons, although they do not like to be long absent from their own
affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the law-courts. Where
there are revenues the demagogues should not be allowed after their
manner to distribute the surplus; the poor are always receiving and
always wanting more and more, for such help is like water poured
into a leaky cask. Yet the true friend of the people should see
that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character
of the democracy; measures therefore should be taken which will
give them lasting prosperity; and as this is equally the interest
of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be
accumulated and distributed among its poor, if possible, in such
quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any
rate, make a beginning in trade or husbandry. And if this
benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be distributed
in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in the meantime
the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the
necessary assemblies; and should in return be excused from useless
public services. By administering the state in this spirit the
Carthaginians retain the affections of the people; their policy is
from time to time to send some of them into their dependent towns,
where they grow rich. It is also worthy of a generous and sensible
nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and give them the means
of going to work. The example of the people of Tarentum is also
well deserving of imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own
property with the poor, they gain their good will. Moreover, they
divide all their offices into two classes, some of them being
elected by vote, the others by lot; the latter, that the people may
participate in them, and the former, that the state may be better
administered. A like result may be gained by dividing the same
offices, so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by
vote, the other by lot.
    Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to
be constituted.
VI
    From these considerations there will be no difficulty in seeing
what should be the constitution of oligarchies. We have only to
reason from opposites and compare each form of oligarchy with the
corresponding form of democracy.
    The first and best attempered of oligarchies is akin to a
constitutional government. In this there ought to be two standards
of qualification; the one high, the other low—the lower qualifying
for the humbler yet indispensable offices and the higher for the
superior ones. He who acquires the prescribed qualification should
have the rights of citizenship. The number of those admitted should
be such as will make the entire governing body stronger than those
who are excluded, and the new citizen should be always taken out of
the better class of the people. The principle, narrowed a little,
gives another form of oligarchy; until at length we reach the most
cliquish and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme
democracy, which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion
to its badness. For as healthy bodies and ships well provided with
sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them, whereas sickly
constitutions and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by the very
least mistake, so do the worst forms of government require the
greatest care. The populousness of democracies generally preserves
them (for e state need not be much increased,since there is no
necessity tha number is to democracy in the place of justice based
on proportion); whereas the preservation of an oligarchy clearly
depends on an opposite principle, viz., good order.
VII
    As there are four chief divisions of the common
people—husbandmen, mechanics, retail traders, laborers; so also
there are four