The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

and beautiful things must
be good things, since the former are productive of pleasure, while
of the beautiful things some are pleasant and some desirable in and
for themselves.
    The following is a more detailed list of things that must be
good. Happiness, as being desirable in itself and sufficient by
itself, and as being that for whose sake we choose many other
things. Also justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity,
magnificence, and all such qualities, as being excellences of the
soul. Further, health, beauty, and the like, as being bodily
excellences and productive of many other good things: for instance,
health is productive both of pleasure and of life, and therefore is
thought the greatest of goods, since these two things which it
causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized
by ordinary people. Wealth, again: for it is the excellence of
possession, and also productive of many other good things. Friends
and friendship: for a friend is desirable in himself and also
productive of many other good things. So, too, honour and
reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of many other good
things, and usually accompanied by the presence of the good things
that cause them to be bestowed. The faculty of speech and action;
since all such qualities are productive of what is good.
Further-good parts, strong memory, receptiveness, quickness of
intuition, and the like, for all such faculties are productive of
what is good. Similarly, all the sciences and arts. And life:
since, even if no other good were the result of life, it is
desirable in itself. And justice, as the cause of good to the
community.
    The above are pretty well all the things admittedly good. In
dealing with things whose goodness is disputed, we may argue in the
following ways:-That is good of which the contrary is bad. That is
good the contrary of which is to the advantage of our enemies; for
example, if it is to the particular advantage of our enemies that
we should be cowards, clearly courage is of particular value to our
countrymen. And generally, the contrary of that which our enemies
desire, or of that at which they rejoice, is evidently valuable.
Hence the passage beginning:
Surely would Priam exult.
    This principle usually holds good, but not always, since it may
well be that our interest is sometimes the same as that of our
enemies. Hence it is said that ‘evils draw men together’; that is,
when the same thing is hurtful to them both.
    Further: that which is not in excess is good, and that which is
greater than it should be is bad. That also is good on which much
labour or money has been spent; the mere fact of this makes it seem
good, and such a good is assumed to be an end-an end reached
through a long chain of means; and any end is a good. Hence the
lines beginning:
And for Priam (and Troy-town’s folk) should
they leave behind them a boast;
    and
Oh, it were shame
To have tarried so long and return empty-handed
as erst we came;
    and there is also the proverb about ‘breaking the pitcher at the
door’.
    That which most people seek after, and which is obviously an
object of contention, is also a good; for, as has been shown, that
is good which is sought after by everybody, and ‘most people’ is
taken to be equivalent to ‘everybody’. That which is praised is
good, since no one praises what is not good. So, again, that which
is praised by our enemies [or by the worthless] for when even those
who have a grievance think a thing good, it is at once felt that
every one must agree with them; our enemies can admit the fact only
because it is evident, just as those must be worthless whom their
friends censure and their enemies do not. (For this reason the
Corinthians conceived themselves to be insulted by Simonides when
he wrote:
Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint.)
    Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the favour
of a discerning or virtuous man or woman, as Odysseus was
distinguished by Athena, Helen by Theseus, Paris by the goddesses,
and Achilles by Homer. And, generally speaking, all things are good
which men deliberately choose to do; this will include the things
already mentioned, and also whatever may be bad for their enemies
or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things
are ‘practicable’ in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2)
it is easy to do them. Things are done ‘easily’ when they are done
either without pain or quickly: the ‘difficulty’ of