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The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

Titel: The Complete Aristotle (eng.) Kostenlos Bücher Online Lesen
Autoren: Aristotle
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an act lies
either in its painfulness or in the long time it takes. Again, a
thing is good if it is as men wish; and they wish to have either no
evil at an or at least a balance of good over evil. This last will
happen where the penalty is either imperceptible or slight. Good,
too, are things that are a man’s very own, possessed by no one
else, exceptional; for this increases the credit of having them. So
are things which befit the possessors, such as whatever is
appropriate to their birth or capacity, and whatever they feel they
ought to have but lack-such things may indeed be trifling, but none
the less men deliberately make them the goal of their action. And
things easily effected; for these are practicable (in the sense of
being easy); such things are those in which every one, or most
people, or one’s equals, or one’s inferiors have succeeded. Good
also are the things by which we shall gratify our friends or annoy
our enemies; and the things chosen by those whom we admire: and the
things for which we are fitted by nature or experience, since we
think we shall succeed more easily in these: and those in which no
worthless man can succeed, for such things bring greater praise:
and those which we do in fact desire, for what we desire is taken
to be not only pleasant but also better. Further, a man of a given
disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things: lovers of
victory make for victory, lovers of honour for honour, money-loving
men for money, and so with the rest. These, then, are the sources
from which we must derive our means of persuasion about Good and
Utility.
7
    Since, however, it often happens that people agree that two
things are both useful but do not agree about which is the more so,
the next step will be to treat of relative goodness and relative
utility.
    A thing which surpasses another may be regarded as being that
other thing plus something more, and that other thing which is
surpassed as being what is contained in the first thing. Now to
call a thing ‘greater’ or ‘more’ always implies a comparison of it
with one that is ‘smaller’ or ‘less’, while ‘great’ and ‘small’,
‘much’ and ‘little’, are terms used in comparison with normal
magnitude. The ‘great’ is that which surpasses the normal, the
‘small’ is that which is surpassed by the normal; and so with
‘many’ and ‘few’.
    Now we are applying the term ‘good’ to what is desirable for its
own sake and not for the sake of something else; to that at which
all things aim; to what they would choose if they could acquire
understanding and practical wisdom; and to that which tends to
produce or preserve such goods, or is always accompanied by them.
Moreover, that for the sake of which things are done is the end (an
end being that for the sake of which all else is done), and for
each individual that thing is a good which fulfils these conditions
in regard to himself. It follows, then, that a greater number of
goods is a greater good than one or than a smaller number, if that
one or that smaller number is included in the count; for then the
larger number surpasses the smaller, and the smaller quantity is
surpassed as being contained in the larger.
    Again, if the largest member of one class surpasses the largest
member of another, then the one class surpasses the other; and if
one class surpasses another, then the largest member of the one
surpasses the largest member of the other. Thus, if the tallest man
is taller than the tallest woman, then men in general are taller
than women. Conversely, if men in general are taller than women,
then the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman. For the
superiority of class over class is proportionate to the superiority
possessed by their largest specimens. Again, where one good is
always accompanied by another, but does not always accompany it, it
is greater than the other, for the use of the second thing is
implied in the use of the first. A thing may be accompanied by
another in three ways, either simultaneously, subsequently, or
potentially. Life accompanies health simultaneously (but not health
life), knowledge accompanies the act of learning subsequently,
cheating accompanies sacrilege potentially, since a man who has
committed sacrilege is always capable of cheating. Again, when two
things each surpass a third, that which does so by the greater
amount is the greater of the two; for it must surpass the greater
as well as the less of the other two. A

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