The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

thing productive of a
greater good than another is productive of is itself a greater good
than that other. For this conception of ‘productive of a greater’
has been implied in our argument. Likewise, that which is produced
by a greater good is itself a greater good; thus, if what is
wholesome is more desirable and a greater good than what gives
pleasure, health too must be a greater good than pleasure. Again, a
thing which is desirable in itself is a greater good than a thing
which is not desirable in itself, as for example bodily strength
than what is wholesome, since the latter is not pursued for its own
sake, whereas the former is; and this was our definition of the
good. Again, if one of two things is an end, and the other is not,
the former is the greater good, as being chosen for its own sake
and not for the sake of something else; as, for example, exercise
is chosen for the sake of physical well-being. And of two things
that which stands less in need of the other, or of other things, is
the greater good, since it is more self-sufficing. (That which
stands ‘less’ in need of others is that which needs either fewer or
easier things.) So when one thing does not exist or cannot come
into existence without a second, while the second can exist without
the first, the second is the better. That which does not need
something else is more self-sufficing than that which does, and
presents itself as a greater good for that reason. Again, that
which is a beginning of other things is a greater good than that
which is not, and that which is a cause is a greater good than that
which is not; the reason being the same in each case, namely that
without a cause and a beginning nothing can exist or come into
existence. Again, where there are two sets of consequences arising
from two different beginnings or causes, the consequences of the
more important beginning or cause are themselves the more
important; and conversely, that beginning or cause is itself the
more important which has the more important consequences. Now it is
plain, from all that has been said, that one thing may be shown to
be more important than another from two opposite points of view: it
may appear the more important (1) because it is a beginning and the
other thing is not, and also (2) because it is not a beginning and
the other thing is-on the ground that the end is more important and
is not a beginning. So Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus, said
that the man who prompted the deed was more guilty than the doer,
since it would not have been done if he had not planned it. On the
other hand, when accusing Chabrias he said that the doer was worse
than the prompter, since there would have been no deed without some
one to do it; men, said he, plot a thing only in order to carry it
out.
    Further, what is rare is a greater good than what is plentiful.
Thus, gold is a better thing than iron, though less useful: it is
harder to get, and therefore better worth getting. Reversely, it
may be argued that the plentiful is a better thing than the rare,
because we can make more use of it. For what is often useful
surpasses what is seldom useful, whence the saying:
The best of things is water.
    More generally: the hard thing is better than the easy, because
it is rarer: and reversely, the easy thing is better than the hard,
for it is as we wish it to be. That is the greater good whose
contrary is the greater evil, and whose loss affects us more.
Positive goodness and badness are more important than the mere
absence of goodness and badness: for positive goodness and badness
are ends, which the mere absence of them cannot be. Further, in
proportion as the functions of things are noble or base, the things
themselves are good or bad: conversely, in proportion as the things
themselves are good or bad, their functions also are good or bad;
for the nature of results corresponds with that of their causes and
beginnings, and conversely the nature of causes and beginnings
corresponds with that of their results. Moreover, those things are
greater goods, superiority in which is more desirable or more
honourable. Thus, keenness of sight is more desirable than keenness
of smell, sight generally being more desirable than smell
generally; and similarly, unusually great love of friends being
more honourable than unusually great love of money, ordinary love
of friends is more honourable than ordinary love of money.
Conversely, if one of two normal things is better or nobler than
the