The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

something, we speak of ‘in excess’ or
‘greater’ in something, as well as of or than something: for what
is in excess or greater is always in excess in something, as well
as in excess of something. Hence the terms in question are not the
genera of ‘double’, inasmuch as they are not used in relation to an
equal number of things with the species. Or possibly it is not
universally true that species and genus are used in relation to an
equal number of things.
    See, also, if the opposite of the species have the opposite of
the genus as its genus, e.g. whether, if ‘multiple’ be the genus of
‘double’, ‘fraction’ be also the genus of ‘half’. For the opposite
of the genus should always be the genus of the opposite species.
If, then, any one were to assert that knowledge is a kind of
sensation, then also the object of knowledge will have to be a kind
of object of sensation, whereas it is not: for an object of
knowledge is not always an object of sensation: for objects of
knowledge include some of the objects of intuition as well. Hence
‘object of sensation’ is not the genus of ‘object of knowledge’:
and if this be so, neither is ‘sensation’ the genus of
‘knowledge’.
    Seeing that of relative terms some are of necessity found in, or
used of, the things in relation to which they happen at any time to
be used (e.g. ‘disposition’ and ‘state’ and ‘balance’; for in
nothing else can the aforesaid terms possibly be found except in
the things in relation to which they are used), while others need
not be found in the things in relation to which they are used at
any time, though they still may be (e.g. if the term ‘object of
knowledge’ be applied to the soul: for it is quite possible that
the knowledge of itself should be possessed by the soul itself, but
it is not necessary, for it is possible for this same knowledge to
be found in some one else), while for others, again, it is
absolutely impossible that they should be found in the things in
relation to which they happen at any time to be used (as e.g. that
the contrary should be found in the contrary or knowledge in the
object of knowledge, unless the object of knowledge happen to be a
soul or a man)-you should look, therefore, and see whether he
places a term of one kind inside a genus that is not of that kind,
e.g. suppose he has said that ‘memory’ is the ‘abiding of
knowledge’. For ‘abiding’ is always found in that which abides, and
is used of that, so that the abiding of knowledge also will be
found in knowledge. Memory, then, is found in knowledge, seeing
that it is the abiding of knowledge. But this is impossible, for
memory is always found in the soul. The aforesaid commonplace rule
is common to the subject of Accident as well: for it is all the
same to say that ‘abiding’ is the genus of memory, or to allege
that it is an accident of it. For if in any way whatever memory be
the abiding of knowledge, the same argument in regard to it will
apply.
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5
    Again, see if he has placed what is a ‘state’ inside the genus
‘activity’, or an activity inside the genus ‘state’, e.g. by
defining ‘sensation’ as ‘movement communicated through the body’:
for sensation is a ‘state’, whereas movement is an ‘activity’.
Likewise, also, if he has said that memory is a ‘state that is
retentive of a conception’, for memory is never a state, but rather
an activity.
    They also make a bad mistake who rank a ‘state’ within the
‘capacity’ that attends it, e.g. by defining ‘good temper’ as the
‘control of anger’, and ‘courage’ and ‘justice’ as ‘control of
fears’ and of ‘gains’: for the terms ‘courageous’ and
‘good-tempered’ are applied to a man who is immune from passion,
whereas ‘self-controlled’ describes the man who is exposed to
passion and not led by it. Quite possibly, indeed, each of the
former is attended by a capacity such that, if he were exposed to
passion, he would control it and not be led by it: but, for all
that, this is not what is meant by being ‘courageous’ in the one
case, and ‘good tempered’ in the other; what is meant is an
absolute immunity from any passions of that kind at all.
    Sometimes, also, people state any kind of attendant feature as
the genus, e.g. ‘pain’ as the genus of ‘anger’ and ‘conception’ as
that of conviction’. For both of the things in question follow in