The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

‘to
write-while-not-writing’: for then it means that he has the power
to write and not to write at once; whereas if one does not combine
them, it means that when he is not writing he has the power to
write. Also, ‘He now if he has learnt his letters’. Moreover, there
is the saying that ‘One single thing if you can carry a crowd you
can carry too’.
    Upon division depend the propositions that 5 is 2 and 3, and
odd, and that the greater is equal: for it is that amount and more
besides. For the same phrase would not be thought always to have
the same meaning when divided and when combined, e.g. ‘I made thee
a slave once a free man’, and ‘God-like Achilles left fifty a
hundred men’.
    An argument depending upon accent it is not easy to construct in
unwritten discussion; in written discussions and in poetry it is
easier. Thus (e.g.) some people emend Homer against those who
criticize as unnatural his expression to men ou kataputhetai ombro.
For they solve the difficulty by a change of accent, pronouncing
the ou with an acuter accent. Also, in the passage about
Agamemnon’s dream, they say that Zeus did not himself say ‘We grant
him the fulfilment of his prayer’, but that he bade the dream grant
it. Instances such as these, then, turn upon the accentuation.
    Others come about owing to the form of expression used, when
what is really different is expressed in the same form, e.g. a
masculine thing by a feminine termination, or a feminine thing by a
masculine, or a neuter by either a masculine or a feminine; or,
again, when a quality is expressed by a termination proper to
quantity or vice versa, or what is active by a passive word, or a
state by an active word, and so forth with the other divisions
previously’ laid down. For it is possible to use an expression to
denote what does not belong to the class of actions at all as
though it did so belong. Thus (e.g.) ‘flourishing’ is a word which
in the form of its expression is like ‘cutting’ or ‘building’: yet
the one denotes a certain quality-i.e. a certain condition-while
the other denotes a certain action. In the same manner also in the
other instances.
    Refutations, then, that depend upon language are drawn from
these common-place rules. Of fallacies, on the other hand, that are
independent of language there are seven kinds:
    (1) that which depends upon Accident:
    (2) the use of an expression absolutely or not absolutely but
with some qualification of respect or place, or time, or
relation:
    (3) that which depends upon ignorance of what ‘refutation’
is:
    (4) that which depends upon the consequent:
    (5) that which depends upon assuming the original
conclusion:
    (6) stating as cause what is not the cause:
    (7) the making of more than one question into one.
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5
    Fallacies, then, that depend on Accident occur whenever any
attribute is claimed to belong in like manner to a thing and to its
accident. For since the same thing has many accidents there is no
necessity that all the same attributes should belong to all of a
thing’s predicates and to their subject as well. Thus (e.g.), ‘If
Coriscus be different from “man”, he is different from himself: for
he is a man’: or ‘If he be different from Socrates, and Socrates be
a man, then’, they say, ‘he has admitted that Coriscus is different
from a man, because it so happens (accidit) that the person from
whom he said that he (Coriscus) is different is a man’.
    Those that depend on whether an expression is used absolutely or
in a certain respect and not strictly, occur whenever an expression
used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used
absolutely, e.g. in the argument ‘If what is not is the object of
an opinion, then what is not is’: for it is not the same thing ‘to
be x’ and ‘to be’ absolutely. Or again, ‘What is, is not, if it is
not a particular kind of being, e.g. if it is not a man.’ For it is
not the same thing ‘not to be x’ and ‘not to be’ at all: it looks
as if it were, because of the closeness of the expression, i.e.
because ‘to be x’ is but little different from ‘to be’, and ‘not to
be x’ from ‘not to be’. Likewise also with any argument that turns
upon the point whether an expression is used in a certain respect
or used absolutely. Thus e.g. ‘Suppose an Indian to be black all
over, but white in respect of his teeth; then he is both white and
not white.’ Or if both