The Science of Discworld II
universe of colour that our brain derives from the light that falls on our retinas does not really exist . The redness of a rose is derived fromits physical features, but âbeing redâ is not a physical feature as such. âEmitting light of a certain wavelengthâ gets closer to being a physical feature. However, the vivid redness that we âseeâ does not correspond to a specific wavelength. Our brains correct the colours of visual images for shadows, light reflected on to parts of the image by other parts of a different colour, and so on. Our sensation of redness is a decoration added to the perception by our brain: a quale. So what we âseeâ is not an accurate perception of what is there, but a mental transform of a sensory perception of what is there.
To a bee, that same uniformly red rose may look very different, with obvious markings. The bee âseesâ in ultraviolet, a wavelength outside our range of perceptions. The rose emits a whole distribution of wave-lengths of light; we see a small part of that, and call it reality. The bee sees a different part and responds to it in its own beelike way, using the markings to land on the flower and collect nectar, or to dismiss it from consideration and fly on to the next possibility. Neither the beeâs perception, nor ours, is the reality.
In Chapter 24 we explained that our minds select what they perceive in more ways than just passively ignoring signals that our senses canât pick up. We fine-tune our senses to see what we want them to see, hear what we want them to hear. There are more nerve connections going from the brain to the ear than there are from the ear to the brain. Those connections adapt the earâs ability to perceive certain sounds, maybe by making it more sensitive to sounds that could represent danger and less sensitive to sounds that donât really matter much. People who are not exposed to certain sounds as children, when their ears and brains are being tuned to pick up language, cannot distinguish them as adults. To the Japanese, the two phonemes âlâ and ârâ sound identical.
The lies that our senses tell us are not malicious. They are partial truths rather than untruths, and the universe is so complicated, and our minds are so simple in comparison, that the best we can ever hope for is half-truths. Even the most esoteric âfundamentalâ physics is at best a half-truth. Indeed, the more âfundamentalâ it becomes, the less true it gets. It is therefore no surprise that the most effective method we have yet devised for passing extelligence on to our children is asystematic series of lies.
It is called âeducationâ.
We can hear the hackles rising even as we write, as quantum signals echo back down the timelines from future readers in the teaching profession turning to this page. But before hurling the book across the room or sending an offended e-mail to the publisher, ask yourself just how much of what you tell children is true. Not worthy, not defensible: true . At once youâll find yourself on the defensive: âAh, yes, but of course children canât understand all of the complexities of the real world. The teacherâs job is to simplify everything as an aid to understanding â¦â
Quite so.
Those simplifications are lies, within the meaning we are currently attaching to that word. But they are helpful lies, constructive lies, lies that even when they are really very wrong still open the door to a better understanding next time round. Consider, for example, the sentence âA hospital is a place where people are sent so that the doctors can make them betterâ. Well, no sensitive adult would wish to tell a child that sometimes people go into hospital alive and come out dead. Or that often itâs not possible to make them better. For a start, the child may have to go into hospital at some stage, and too big a dose of truth early on might make it difficult for the parents to persuade them to do so without making a fuss. Nonetheless, no adult would consider that sentence to be an accurate statement of what hospitals are really about. It is, at best, an ideal to which hospitals aspire. And when we justify our description on the grounds that the truth would upset the child, we are admitting that the sentence is a lie, and asserting that social conventions and human comfort are more important than giving an accurate
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