Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris

January 1933, unpubl.).
    200 .
Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung,
iv. 604–7; reprinted in Deuerlein,
Aufstieg,
411–14, here 412.
    201 . Deuerlein,
Aufstieg,
412.
    202 .
TBJG,
I.2, 332 (10 January 1933, unpubl.).
    203 . Papen, 228; Deuerlein,
Aufstieg,
412–13; Winkler,
Weimar,
568.
    204 . Meissner,
Staatssekretär,
261–2; Turner,
Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power,
50–51·
    205 . Ribbentrop, 22 and n.1.
    206 . Falter
et al., Wahlen, 96.
    207 . Stories advanced at the time, and often repeated in later accounts, of subventions from big business to finance the Lippe campaign have been shown to be wide of the mark. The campaign had to pay for itself. Higher entrance fees than normal were charged for meetings addressed by Hitler and other celebrities. Funds raised were immediately poured back into the campaign. Financial embarrassment in settling the claims of creditors and in raising money to rent halls for speakers was on more than one occasion only narrowly avoided. See Turner,
German Big Business,
318 and 463 n.25.
    208 . Winkler,
Weimar,
573. A full analysis of the campaign is provided by Jutta Ciolek-Kümper,
Wahlkampf in Lippe,
Munich, 1976; for Nazi propaganda in Lippe, see also Paul,
Aufstand der Bilder,
I09–10.
    209 . Beginning on 4 and ending on 14 January 1933: Domarus, 175–80; Ciolek-Kümper, 318–64. Nazi gains at the election were over-average in places where Hitler spoke (Ciolek-Kümper, 264).
    210 . Falter
et al., Wahlen, 96;
Deuerlein,
Aufstieg,
415; Winkler,
Weimar,
574.Despite the saturation propaganda, the Lippe election is a clear indicator of the limits of Nazi penetration in a pluralist system. Recent empirical findings have confirmed the view that propaganda success relied upon prior ideological leanings in those susceptible to it. (See Dieter Ohr,
Nationalsozialistische Propaganda und Weimarer Wahlen. Empirische Analysen zur Wirkung von ΝSDAP – Versammlungen,
Opladen, 1997.)
    211 . See Goebbels’s diary entry (unpubl.), for 16 January 1933: ‘Party again on the forward march. So, it has paid off
(TBJG,
I.2, 339).
    212 . Schleicher had, by the time of his cabinet meeting on 16 January, still not completely given up hope of winning over Strasser, whose supporters had likewise not finally given up. Their efforts, and news of Strasser meeting President Hindenburg, sowed great distrust in the minds of Hitler and his entourage (Turner,
Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, 60–61).
    213 . Papen, 234; Winkler,
Weimar,
571–2, 578–80, 606–7; Turner,
German Big Business,
324.
    214 . Winkler,
Weimar,
574–5.
    215 . Ribbentrop, 22–3. After consultations with Hitler, he had tried to arrange the meeting on one of the previous two days, but the respective movements of Hitler and Papen had made this impossible. Papen stated in his memoirs that he did not meet Hitler between 4 and 22 January (Papen, 236). Frau Ribbentrop’s dictated notes show that there were two meetings in the interim, on 10 and 18 January (Ribbentrop, 22–3).
    216 . Ribbentrop, 23; Papen, 235.
    217 .
TBJG,
I.2, 346 (22 January 1932, unpubl.). Goebbels does not appear to have been informed about the meeting until two days later, on 24 January
(TBJG,
I.2, 349 (25 January 1933, unpubl.)).
    218 . Domarus, 181–2;
TBJG,
I.2, 348 (23 January 1932, unpubl.). Goebbels attributed Hitler’s poor form to the arrogance of Frau Wessel, Horst’s mother, on the anniversary of her son’s murder
(TBJG,
I.2, 347–8).
    219 . Papen, 235.
    220 . Hans Otto Meissner and Harry Wilde,
Die Machtergreifung,
Stuttgart, 1958, 148ff., esp. 162–3; Domarus, 183 (who states, mistakenly, that the demands were the same; moreover, the Göring ministry was left undetermined). See also Winkler,
Weimar,
580.
    221 .
TBJG,
I.2, 349 (25 January 1933, unpubl.).
    222 . Ribbentrop, 23.
    223 . Winkler,
Weimar,
580. Otto Meissner,
Staatssekretär,
263, makes no mention of this conversation in his brief account of the meeting at Ribbentrop’s house. The version of his son, Hans Otto Meissner, and Harry Wilde, noting Oskar von Hindenburg’s seemingly grudging admission that Hitler’s many concessions and solemn promises made it difficult to refuse him the Chancellorship, derived, however, from Otto Meissner’s recollection (Meissner-Wilde, 163, 291 n.37).
    224 .
TBJG, 1
.2, 349 (25 January 1933, unpubl.).
    225 .Papen, 236; Winkler,
Weimar,
581. For reasons not entirely clear, Schleicher had not considered putting to Hindenburg the suggestion of his