Strongman, The

the history of those events to his own advantage. But he implied two interesting things: first, that Medvedev had indicated he was not fully in charge of policy (this is credible, given that Medvedev had been in office for only two months), and, second, that he had hinted darkly that Russia was planning military action (though Medvedev’s words can also be read as simply meaning that events were spinning out of control). The important thing, when piecing together the events that led to war, is that Saakashvili interpreted Medvedev’s words as a threat – which he might have been tempted to forestall.
    Saakashvili concludes his story of the nightclub encounter somewhat melodramatically. ‘Apparently I was looking nervous. Nazarbayev came to me and said, “Misha, what’s wrong with you? I’ve never seen you so pale – what did he tell you?” I said, “Nothing.” And then he said, “Don’t worry, things will be sorted out, you know, give him some time, I’m sure you can find a way.” ’ 18
    In an interview with Ekho Moskvy three years after the war, Saakashvili said that after Astana he tried repeatedly to call Medvedev but was always told: ‘Wait. We’ll call you when it’s time.’ Saakashvili interprets Medvedev’s evasiveness as proof that ‘he was no longer inclined to have a serious conversation’ because ‘he knew what could [be about to] happen’. 19
    Medvedev’s account is entirely different. He says the two did agree to meet again for ‘a serious discussion’ in Sochi, but Saakashvili then went ominously quiet. ‘I can tell you earnestly: I spent the next month checking regularly for any feedback from our Georgian counterpart. There was nothing.’ Both Medvedev and three other senior Russians all made the same point in interviews (clearly it is the conclusion they reached in their internal discussions later): that Saakashvili, for whatever reason, fell silent after he was visited by Condoleezza Rice in Tbilisi four days later. Medvedev said: ‘Following that visit, my Georgian colleague simply dropped all communications with us. He simply stopped talking to us, he stopped writing letters and making phone calls. It was apparent that he had some new plans now.’ 20
    It is undeniable that Rice sent mixed signals during her visit – indeed she says so herself. She flew to Georgia on 9 July. The day before, the Russians had engaged in a little more sabre-rattling – flying warplanes over South Ossetia ‘to cool hot heads in Tbilisi’, as the foreign ministry put it. Dining in the Kopala restaurant, on a veranda overlooking the Mtkvari river, Rice again insisted to the Georgian leader that he had to reject the use of force.
    ‘Why should I do that?’ he replied. ‘I will get nothing for it.’
    Rice replied: ‘You’re going to have to do it, you have no option ... If you engage Russian forces, nobody will come to your aid and you will lose.’ 21 Her tough words in private, though, gave way in her public statements to what Saakashvili may have seen as encouragement for his plans. At a press conference before leaving Tbilisi, Rice strongly endorsed Georgia’s territorial integrity and criticised Russia, adding, ‘We take very, very strongly our obligation to help our allies defend themselves, and no one should be confused about that.’ In an interview Rice said this was no idle promise: ‘It was very important for the Georgians to know that if they did the difficult things, the United States would stand by them, if the Russians didn’t stand by their obligations. And I absolutely, deliberately – in front of the press – said that the United States would stand by Georgia.’
    The Russians, it seems, believe that Saakashvili heard in this the encouragement he needed. Medvedev says: ‘I don’t believe the Americans urged Georgia’s president to invade. But I do believe that there were certain subtleties and certain hints made ... which could effectively feed Saakashvili’s apparent hopes that the Americans would back him in any conflict. In politics, connotations and nuances are very important.’
    In short, Medvedev believes Saakashvili took encouragement from Rice’s words and decided to invade South Ossetia, and therefore stopped communicating with Moscow. Saakashvili believes Medvedev stopped communicating because he had been told to shut up by Putin, who had already taken a decision to invade Georgia. Whatever the truth, there was now silence, and therefore